185.218.86.14

In feed.txt Persistent Regular Toolkit

Blocked indefinitely since 14 Oct 2026 09:57 UTC on our servers, including web requests through Cloudflare, and in feed.txt. A hosting-network block has no end date; it ends only through the delisting path.

Record

Score: 46/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 234all time
Active days: 2UTC days
First seen: 14 Oct 2026
Last seen: 16 Oct 2026 15:01
Servers hit: 10
Targets: 10sites
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 14 Oct 2026 09:52 UTC, most recently active on 16 Oct 2026 15:01 UTC.

Recorded 234 attack-shaped requests across 2 separate days.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (96 requests); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (52); it also fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds (16).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against 10 of the sites we watch, among them 4emx.com, bgpoet.com, comops.eu, dubstard.com and homocontinum.com.

Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badges: Regular and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 14 Oct 2026 09:00 UTC, with 230 requests.

Routed via AS218785 (Tc Datacenter Limited), a hosting network.

Surfaces: honeypot, web-app. Attack types: scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 2 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 14 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
14 Oct 2026	230
16 Oct 2026	4

At least 71 requests a minute at its peak (14 Oct 2026 09:53 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 225.
The servers we watch answered: 404 147, 403 62, 301 11, 200 4 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
16 Oct 2026
15:00–15:01	3 sites	3× probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/config`	browser claim	edge
14:32	comops.eu	probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/config`	other	edge
14 Oct 2026
09:59	schetio.com	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yml`	browser claim	web
09:59	schetio.com	requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes	`GET /.htpasswd`	browser claim	web
09:59	schetio.com	4× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (4 distinct paths)	`GET /secrets.json`	browser claim	web
09:59	obdebug.com	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yml`	browser claim	web
09:59	schetio.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /.aws/credentials`	browser claim	web
09:59	schetio.com	2× fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds (2 distinct paths)	`GET /test.php`	browser claim	web
09:59	schetio.com	requested phpinfo.php, which dumps the full PHP configuration and environment if left in place	`GET /phpinfo.php`	browser claim	web
09:59	obdebug.com	requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes	`GET /.htpasswd`	browser claim	web
09:59	2 sites	3× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (3 distinct paths)	`GET /secrets.json`	browser claim	web
09:59	schetio.com	requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings	`GET /config.json`	browser claim	web
09:59	2 sites	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /web.config`	browser claim	web
09:59	schetio.com	requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable	`/.git`	none	web
09:59	schetio.com	requested wp-config.php or a backup copy of it, hoping to read the database password in clear text	`GET /wp-config.php`	browser claim	edge
09:59	schetio.com	probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/config`	browser claim	web
09:59	schetio.com	swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`/api`	none	web
09:59	schetio.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /app/.env`	browser claim	web
09:59	schetio.com	probed a list of common site paths looking for an unprotected admin panel or staging copy	`/admin`	none	web
09:59	schetio.com	6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (6 distinct paths)	`GET /admin/.env`	browser claim	web
09:59	obdebug.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /aws-credentials`	browser claim	web
09:59	schetio.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.save`	browser claim	web
09:59	obdebug.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.aws/config`	browser claim	web
09:59	schetio.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.bak`	browser claim	web
09:59	obdebug.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /.aws/credentials`	browser claim	web
09:59	obdebug.com	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`GET /test.php`	browser claim	web
09:59	obdebug.com	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`GET /info.php`	browser claim	web
09:59	obdebug.com	requested phpinfo.php, which dumps the full PHP configuration and environment if left in place	`GET /phpinfo.php`	browser claim	web
09:59	obdebug.com	sent a request whose combined suspicious-pattern score crossed the web firewall's alert threshold; the request was observed and not blocked	`/.travis.yml`	none	web
09:58	obdebug.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /aws.config.js`	browser claim	web
09:58	obdebug.com	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yml`	browser claim	web
09:58	obdebug.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /aws-config.js`	browser claim	web
09:58	obdebug.com	requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes	`GET /.htpasswd`	browser claim	web
09:58	obdebug.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /secrets.json`	browser claim	web

Network

ASN: AS218785 Tc Datacenter Limited
Network type: hosting
Reverse DNS: none
Country: Bulgaria BG
Flags: none observed
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 14 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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Delisting

This block has no end date. If the range now belongs to someone else, it can leave the list through the free delisting path; every decision is published on the delisting log.