The Watchtower
The addresses attacking servers like yours, as our sensors see it happen: who they are, what they tried, and a free signed block list for your own firewall. How this works
Attacks per hour, last 7 days
Attack events per hour, UTC. The last 24 hours are bright; the outlined bar at the right is the current hour so far (3-hour bars on this screen).
Today vs a usual day
- Web 29,141 in 24 hours, about a usual day (usual day 23,803). Mostly hunting for secrets from Google LLC.
- Mail 1,254 in 24 hours, 5 times a usual day (usual day 249). Mostly password guessing from Cox Communications Inc..
- SSH 7,645 in 24 hours, quieter than a usual day (usual day 12,144). Mostly scanning from Unmanaged Ltd.
- Panel 0 in 24 hours, no usual day to compare.
Daily totals, UTC
| Day (UTC) | Events | Busiest hour | Events that hour |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6,085 | 23:00 | 2,422 | |
| 33,220 | 14:00 | 3,688 | |
| 32,441 | 11:00 | 3,504 | |
| 32,044 | 10:00 | 3,144 | |
| 32,037 | 13:00 | 3,187 | |
| 43,503 | 13:00 | 3,968 | |
| 52,809 | 19:00 | 4,422 | |
| 28,766 | 09:00 | 2,839 |
- Last 24 hours
- 39,101 events
1,760 addresses - Last 7 days
- 262,944 events
6,515 addresses - Since 9 Sep
- 1,847,980 events
27,722 addresses
Last attack UTC, 1 min ago. Updated UTC.
106,115 connection attempts from blocked addresses dropped at our firewalls since .
Is my IP here?
Live feed
| Time (UTC) | Address | What happened | Seen by | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| - | 109.160.32.120 | 173 req tried a username and password on a decoy remote login that never lets anyone in (+1 more kind) | honeypot | |
| 180.212.27.234 | attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong password | |||
| 187.93.68.178 | attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong password | |||
| 176.103.15.195 | attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong password | |||
| 128.185.208.42 | attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong password | |||
| - | 185.177.72.15 | 5 req · 2 paths swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner (+1 more kind) | web | |
| 129.226.174.80 | requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for | honeypot | ||
| 175.210.10.97 | attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong password | |||
| 39.164.91.67 | attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong password | |||
| 172.98.33.15 | probed a WordPress admin/content path used to fingerprint the installation or hunt for an exposed upload/plugin surface | web | ||
| 149.54.62.170 | attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong password | |||
| 117.39.63.46 | attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong password | |||
| - | 222.210.35.197 | 15 req tried a username and password on a decoy remote login that never lets anyone in | honeypot | |
| 103.230.176.152 | attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong password | |||
| 1.250.67.190 | attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong password |
One row per address, newest first: the latest 15 of the 50 most recent rows.
Blocked in the last hour 16
- 129.226.174.80BlockedScanning · cloud, Tencent Building, Kejizhongyi Avenue
- 109.160.32.120BlockedPassword guessing · home broadband, Banatsync Srl
- 35.196.183.67BlockedScanning · cloud, Google LLC
- 18.144.253.59BlockedHunting for secrets · cloud, Amazon.com, Inc.
- 165.22.59.117BlockedScanning · hosting, DigitalOcean, LLC
- 82.22.44.217BlockedHunting for secrets · home broadband, RCN
- 197.248.207.139BlockedPassword guessing · home broadband, Safaricom Limited
- 146.196.81.148BlockedScanning · home broadband, Cloudie Limited
- 80.240.246.208BlockedPassword guessing · home broadband, Rostelecom
- 20.87.214.225BlockedScanning · cloud, Microsoft Corporation
- 195.122.253.45BlockedPassword guessing · home broadband, MTS PJSC
- 152.42.200.7BlockedScanning · hosting, DigitalOcean, LLC
- 132.145.122.251BlockedPassword guessing · cloud, Oracle Corporation
- 172.176.125.150BlockedScanning · cloud, Microsoft Corporation
- 34.171.227.164BlockedScanning · cloud, Google LLC
- 5.102.169.100BlockedScanning · home broadband, CustodianDC Limited
Blocked on our servers’ firewalls within minutes of the attack (IPv4, and IPv6 where our servers support it; what a block stops). Every address here is in feed.txt.
Most Wanted
Right now
| # | Address | Score | State | Network | Seen by | Last seen (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2.57.122.202 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Unmanaged Ltd | edge, web | |
| 2 | 20.211.97.120 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Microsoft Corporation | edge, web | |
| 3 | 20.217.186.29 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Microsoft Corporation | edge, web | |
| 4 | 34.62.116.145 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Google LLC | edge, web | |
| 5 | 45.138.12.16 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Tc Datacenter Limited | edge, honeypot, web | |
| 6 | 45.138.12.19 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Tc Datacenter Limited | edge, honeypot, web | |
| 7 | 45.138.12.42 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Tc Datacenter Limited | edge, honeypot, web | |
| 8 | 45.138.12.44 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Tc Datacenter Limited | edge, honeypot, web | |
| 9 | 45.138.12.216 | 100 | Blocked Campaign member | Tc Datacenter Limited | edge, web | |
| 10 | 45.138.12.217 | 100 | Blocked Campaign member | Tc Datacenter Limited | edge, web | |
| 11 | 45.148.10.13 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Techoff Srv Limited | edge, web | |
| 12 | 45.148.10.64 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Techoff Srv Limited | edge, honeypot, web | |
| 13 | 45.148.10.120 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Techoff Srv Limited | edge, web | |
| 14 | 85.11.167.160 | 100 | Blocked | TechTies Inc. | edge, web | |
| 15 | 93.123.109.230 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Techoff Srv Limited | edge, web | |
| 16 | 102.220.160.173 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | VPS Dedicated LLC | edge, web | |
| 17 | 169.40.142.177 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Zkillu SAS | edge, web | |
| 18 | 185.218.86.14 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | Tc Datacenter Limited | edge, web | |
| 19 | 193.32.162.175 | 100 | Blocked | Unmanaged Ltd | edge, honeypot, web | |
| 20 | 194.180.49.41 | 100 | Blocked Toolkit | MEVSPACE sp. z o.o. | edge, honeypot, web |
Score: the current score out of 100, reputation only (a block does not depend on it); every address here is at level Wanted; every one carries Regular.
All time
| # | Address | Score | Worst level | Requests | Active days | Times blocked | First seen | Last seen | State |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 45.148.10.120 | 74 | Wanted | 1,438 | 61 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 2 | 93.123.109.247 | 73 | Wanted | 27,109 | 13 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 3 | 45.148.10.244 | 73 | Wanted | 10,997 | 31 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 4 | 45.138.12.16 | 69 | Wanted | 3,431 | 26 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 5 | 124.168.251.242 | 68 | Brute | 9,918 | 1 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 6 | 45.138.12.24 | 68 | Wanted | 8,506 | 17 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 7 | 45.138.12.6 | 68 | Wanted | 1,670 | 36 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 8 | 195.178.110.242 | 67 | Wanted | 3,302 | 23 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 9 | 102.220.163.241 | 67 | Wanted | 7,365 | 17 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 10 | 34.34.129.14 | 67 | Persistent | 46,125 | 2 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 11 | 195.178.110.22 | 67 | Wanted | 10,783 | 10 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 12 | 195.178.110.102 | 67 | Wanted | 5,590 | 20 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 13 | 195.178.110.228 | 67 | Persistent | 15,904 | 17 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 14 | 45.148.10.21 | 67 | Wanted | 3,180 | 21 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 15 | 207.175.237.2 | 66 | Persistent | 38,091 | 2 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 16 | 45.138.12.22 | 66 | Wanted | 5,181 | 18 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 17 | 195.178.110.199 | 66 | Wanted | 3,659 | 19 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 18 | 34.95.243.122 | 65 | Persistent | 10,100 | 3 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 19 | 195.178.110.135 | 65 | Wanted | 4,993 | 15 | 1 | Blocked | ||
| 20 | 92.118.39.14 | 65 | Persistent | 11,721 | 18 | 1 | Blocked |
All-time score out of 100, kept after the 90-day evidence window: recent attacks count most (each request counts half as much after 30 days), plus days active, kinds of service attacked and times blocked. Only addresses that were blocked at least once. How it is computed
Breakdowns
Attack types, 7 days: hunting for secrets leads with 114,425 of 262,944
| Attack type | Events | Share |
|---|---|---|
| hunting for secrets | 114,425 | |
| scanning | 85,313 | |
| password guessing | 43,541 | |
| password spraying | 8,238 | |
| scanning tools | 4,028 | |
| injection | 3,328 | |
| known exploits | 1,986 | |
| unclassified | 1,142 | |
| leaked-password reuse | 565 | |
| mail relay probing | 247 | |
| flooding | 88 | |
| fake crawlers | 35 | |
| open proxy probing | 8 |
By surface
| Surface | Attack type | Events |
|---|---|---|
| web-app | hunting for secrets | 110,792 |
| ssh | scanning | 53,744 |
| ssh | password guessing | 36,215 |
| web-app | scanning | 24,056 |
| web-app | password spraying | 8,085 |
| honeypot | scanning | 7,068 |
| web-app | scanning tools | 3,907 |
| mail-smtp | password guessing | 3,789 |
| honeypot | hunting for secrets | 3,633 |
| web-app | injection | 3,110 |
| web-app | known exploits | 1,890 |
| web-app | password guessing | 1,077 |
| web-app | unclassified | 1,028 |
| ftp | password guessing | 942 |
| mail-imap-pop | password guessing | 769 |
| db | password guessing | 749 |
| honeypot | leaked-password reuse | 565 |
| mail-smtp | scanning | 445 |
| mail-smtp | mail relay probing | 247 |
| honeypot | injection | 218 |
| mail-imap-pop | password spraying | 151 |
| ssh | unclassified | 114 |
| honeypot | known exploits | 96 |
| honeypot | scanning tools | 90 |
| web-app | flooding | 86 |
| web-app | fake crawlers | 35 |
| ssh | scanning tools | 31 |
| honeypot | open proxy probing | 8 |
| honeypot | password spraying | 2 |
| honeypot | flooding | 2 |
What they tried, 7 days: top 12 kinds
| Kind of request | Events | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | 67,298 | |
| Typed a command into a decoy shell that is not connected to anything real | 53,668 | |
| Tried a username and password on a decoy remote login that never lets anyone in | 36,215 | |
| Requested a database dump or site archive by its common backup filename | 13,880 | |
| Fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | 9,842 | |
| Requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | 8,768 | |
| Requested xmlrpc.php, which exposes a multicall method commonly abused to spray WordPress credentials and relay pingback floods | 8,087 | |
| Requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for | 6,889 | |
| Requested a WordPress core file used to fingerprint the installed version and active plugins | 4,849 | |
| Requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable | 4,671 | |
| Attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong password | 4,304 | |
| Requested phpinfo.php, which dumps the full PHP configuration and environment if left in place | 3,559 |
Networks: Google LLC leads with 4,512 addresses
| ASN | Organisation | Addresses | Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| AS396982 | Google LLC | 4,512 | |
| AS16276 | OVH SAS | 3,206 | |
| AS14061 | DigitalOcean, LLC | 2,476 | |
| AS8075 | Microsoft Corporation | 1,580 | |
| AS206092 | F.n.s. Holdings Limited | 778 | |
| AS14618 | Amazon.com, Inc. | 775 | |
| AS132203 | Tencent Building, Kejizhongyi Avenue | 728 | |
| AS32934 | Facebook, Inc. | 712 | |
| AS22773 | Cox Communications Inc. | 554 | |
| AS25369 | Hydra Communications Ltd | 508 |
Countries: United States leads with 12,278 addresses
| Country | Addresses | Share |
|---|---|---|
| United States US | 12,278 | |
| United Kingdom GB | 2,955 | |
| Singapore SG | 1,682 | |
| China CN | 1,639 | |
| France FR | 1,520 | |
| India IN | 1,473 | |
| Germany DE | 1,198 | |
| The Netherlands NL | 1,193 | |
| Brazil BR | 1,096 | |
| Belgium BE | 921 |
Campaigns
20 groups of addresses sharing one user agent and the same paths
| Addresses | User agent | Paths requested | Surfaces | First seen | Last seen |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 51 | browser claim | /xmlrpc.php | honeypot, web-app | ||
| 20 | browser claim | /wp-login.php /wp-json/batch/v1 | honeypot, web-app | ||
| 19 | browser claim | /news.php? | web-app | ||
| 17 | browser claim | /wp-login.php | honeypot, web-app | ||
| 17 | browser claim | /wp-login.php | honeypot, web-app | ||
| 15 | browser claim | /xmlrpc.php | honeypot, web-app | ||
| 14 | other | //cgi-bin/cgi-bin/cgi-bin/cgi-bin/cache.php | web-app | ||
| 14 | browser claim | /wp-login.php | honeypot, web-app | ||
| 14 | browser claim | /wp-login.php | |||
| 12 | browser claim | /wp-login.php | honeypot, web-app | ||
| 12 | declared bot | / | honeypot, mail-smtp, ssh | ||
| 11 | browser claim | /wp-login.php | honeypot, web-app | ||
| 10 | browser claim | //wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml //xmlrpc.php? //blog/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml //web/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml //wordpress/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml | honeypot, web-app | ||
| 10 | browser claim | /wp-login.php /xmlrpc.php | honeypot, web-app | ||
| 10 | python | /license.txt | web-app | ||
| 10 | browser claim | /wp-login.php | honeypot, ssh, web-app | ||
| 9 | browser claim | //wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml //xmlrpc.php? //blog/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml //web/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml //wordpress/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml | web-app | ||
| 7 | browser claim | / | honeypot, web-app | ||
| 7 | browser claim | /wp-admin/ | web-app | ||
| 7 | browser claim | /wp-login.php | honeypot, web-app |
User agent is the family of the string the requests sent (a browser string is only a claim). Paths are shown without their query strings.
AI crawlers, last 30 days
134,398 requests from 11 crawlers
Requests whose user agent claims to be one of these crawlers. Facts only: none of these numbers scores or blocks an address. Columns are defined on the about page.
| Crawler | Requests | Admin or sensitive paths | Ordinary pages | Addresses, rDNS matches | Addresses, no match | Blocked at edge | Reached the servers we watch |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ClaudeBot | 24,920 | 17,053 | 7,867 | 0 | 467 | 0 | 24,920 |
| PetalBot | 19,824 | 1 | 19,823 | 77 | 0 | 0 | 19,824 |
| Meta-ExternalAgent | 18,936 | 5,733 | 13,203 | 0 | 897 | 0 | 18,936 |
| PerplexityBot | 15,481 | 11,240 | 4,241 | 0 | 423 | 0 | 15,481 |
| Amazonbot | 13,032 | 5,444 | 7,588 | 0 | 829 | 0 | 13,032 |
| GPTBot | 11,079 | 5,711 | 5,368 | 0 | 425 | 0 | 11,079 |
| Bytespider | 7,923 | 5,616 | 2,307 | 4 | 396 | 0 | 7,923 |
| DeepSeekBot | 7,904 | 5,668 | 2,236 | 0 | 415 | 0 | 7,904 |
| CCBot | 7,714 | 5,627 | 2,087 | 0 | 401 | 0 | 7,714 |
| cohere-ai | 7,560 | 5,473 | 2,087 | 0 | 395 | 0 | 7,560 |
| Google-Extended/GoogleOther | 25 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 19 | 0 | 25 |
Hoster responses, ranked
Abuse reports we sent, per abuse contact, and what came back. Ranked by resolved share, then acknowledged share, then reports sent.
| # | Hoster | Reports sent | Acknowledged | Resolved | Resolved % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | [email protected] | 98 | 98 | 0 | 0% |
| 2 | [email protected] | 16 | 16 | 0 | 0% |
| 3 | [email protected] | 11 | 11 | 0 | 0% |
| 4 | [email protected] | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0% |
| 5 | [email protected] | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0% |
| 6 | [email protected] | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0% |
| 7 | [email protected] | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0% |
| 8 | [email protected] | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0% |
| 9 | [email protected] | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0% |
| 10 | [email protected] | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0% |
| 11 | [email protected] | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0% |
| 12 | [email protected] | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0% |
| 13 | [email protected] | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0% |
| 14 | [email protected] | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0% |
| 15 | [email protected] | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0% |
| 16 | [email protected] | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0% |
| 17 | [email protected] | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0% |
| 18 | [email protected] | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0% |
| 19 | [email protected] | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0% |
| 20 | [email protected] | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0% |
Credentials board
Aggregate counts only, never tied to an address.
Top usernames
root89,861admin10,39719,389ubuntu9,156user3,543deploy2,441test2,362postgres1,827345gs5662d341,743
Top passwords
1234569,1625,8164,86312344,024123456782,5912,5282,426password2,213123452,1042,034
Weekly digests
Each week in numbers: requests, addresses, networks, what they tried, new blocks. Atom feed
- Week 46 of 2026 9 Nov to 15 Nov 2026 · 265,789 requests, 5,492 addresses, 2,182 new blocks
- Week 45 of 2026 2 Nov to 8 Nov 2026 · 306,962 requests, 4,670 addresses, 2,054 new blocks
- Week 44 of 2026 26 Oct to 1 Nov 2026 · 321,450 requests, 4,403 addresses, 1,915 new blocks
- Week 43 of 2026 19 Oct to 25 Oct 2026 · 269,474 requests, 6,696 addresses, 3,012 new blocks
- Week 42 of 2026 12 Oct to 18 Oct 2026 · 190,885 requests, 3,809 addresses, 4,471 new blocks
- Week 41 of 2026 5 Oct to 11 Oct 2026 · 242,146 requests, 2,926 addresses, 342 new blocks
- Week 40 of 2026 28 Sep to 4 Oct 2026 · 153,654 requests, 2,212 addresses, 309 new blocks
- Week 39 of 2026 21 Sep to 27 Sep 2026 · 7,632 requests, 549 addresses, 0 new blocks
- Week 38 of 2026 14 Sep to 20 Sep 2026 · 9,386 requests, 602 addresses, 0 new blocks
- Week 37 of 2026 7 Sep to 13 Sep 2026 · 5,167 requests, 362 addresses, 0 new blocks
Feeds
feed.txt, 14,956 addresses, updated UTC
Free, no account, no warranty. Regenerated within minutes of a new block; each file answers conditional requests (ETag, Last-Modified), so polling costs a 304. Feed terms
A block has no end date: it stays on the list until we lift it ourselves. feed.txt carries IPv4 addresses first, then a comment line, then IPv6 prefixes; load only the IPv4 part into an IPv4 set. The week in numbers: weekly digest feed (Atom). In a terminal: Teletype report.
| File | What’s in it | Who it’s for | Addresses | Updated (UTC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| feed.txt | Every blocked address, IPv4 first, then a comment line, then IPv6 as /64 prefixes, one per line | Anyone: load it into a firewall (CSF, pfSense, ipset, Cloudflare list) | 14,956 | |
| feed.json | Every blocked address with score, network, first and last seen, classes, dossier link and history | Scripts and SIEMs | 15,277 | |
| released.txt | Addresses we stopped blocking in the last 14 days, one per line with the time and the reason (owner) | Anyone who loads the block list and wants to lift blocks promptly. A release means we stopped blocking this address. It is not a clearance and says nothing about the address today. | 0 | |
| vocab-v1.json | The surface and attack-type words used in the files | Anyone decoding feed.json |
Verify before you load
Every file has a detached signature next to it (feed.txt.minisig and so on). Signing key id 9d1640d9d818429c, also published at pubkey.minisig.
minisign -Vm feed.txt -P RWSdFkDZ2BhCnFMaPrwsWM2kuzOMB/LPb79AdntSMH5cdVI/ucFTfP2KUse the list
pfSense (pfBlockerNG)
IPv4 tab, add a custom list:
URL: https://servbg.com/feeds/threats/feed.txt
Update: every hour
Action: Deny InboundOPNsense (URL Table alias) check on your product
Firewall > Aliases > Add
Type: URL Table (IPs)
Content: https://servbg.com/feeds/threats/feed.txt
Refresh: 1 hour
Then use the alias as the source of a block rule on WAN.Not tested on this product by us; read it against your version’s documentation before you use it.
CSF
Add one line to csf.blocklists (0 = every line):
SERVBGWANTED|3600|0|https://servbg.com/feeds/threats/feed.txt
In csf.conf: LF_IPSET = "1" and LF_IPSET_MAXELEM = "1048576"ipset + iptables
set -e
curl -fsS -o /tmp/wt.txt https://servbg.com/feeds/threats/feed.txt
ipset list -n servbg_wanted >/dev/null 2>&1 || ipset create servbg_wanted hash:ip maxelem 1048576
ipset destroy servbg_wanted_new 2>/dev/null || true
ipset create servbg_wanted_new hash:ip maxelem 1048576
grep -E '^[0-9.]+$' /tmp/wt.txt | sed 's/^/add servbg_wanted_new /' | ipset restore -exist
ipset swap servbg_wanted_new servbg_wanted
ipset destroy servbg_wanted_new
iptables -N SERVBG_WANTED 2>/dev/null || true
iptables -F SERVBG_WANTED
iptables -A SERVBG_WANTED -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j RETURN
iptables -A SERVBG_WANTED -p tcp --dport 22 -j RETURN
iptables -A SERVBG_WANTED -j DROP
iptables -C INPUT -m set --match-set servbg_wanted src -j SERVBG_WANTED 2>/dev/null \
|| iptables -I INPUT -m set --match-set servbg_wanted src -j SERVBG_WANTEDnftables check on your product
nft add table inet servbg
nft add set inet servbg wanted '{ type ipv4_addr; flags interval; }'
nft add chain inet servbg input '{ type filter hook input priority -10; }'
nft add rule inet servbg input ip saddr @wanted drop
curl -fsS https://servbg.com/feeds/threats/feed.txt | grep -E '^[0-9.]+$' \
| { echo 'flush set inet servbg wanted'; printf 'add element inet servbg wanted { '; paste -sd, -; echo ' }'; } \
| nft -f -Not tested on this product by us; read it against your version’s documentation before you use it.
IPv6 networks appear in feed.txt as /64 lines, after the IPv4 addresses. CSF and OPNsense load both; the ipset and nftables snippets load the IPv4 lines.
The ipset version returns established connections and SSH (change 22 to your port) before it drops. More notes on the about page. Keep your own management port reachable before you load any list.