The Watchtower

The addresses attacking servers like yours, as our sensors see it happen: who they are, what they tried, and a free signed block list for your own firewall. How this works

Attacks per hour, last 7 days

Attack events per hour, UTC. The last 24 hours are bright; the outlined bar at the right is the current hour so far (3-hour bars on this screen).

Today vs a usual day

  • Web 29,141 in 24 hours, about a usual day (usual day 23,803). Mostly hunting for secrets from Google LLC.
  • Mail 1,254 in 24 hours, 5 times a usual day (usual day 249). Mostly password guessing from Cox Communications Inc..
  • SSH 7,645 in 24 hours, quieter than a usual day (usual day 12,144). Mostly scanning from Unmanaged Ltd.
  • Panel 0 in 24 hours, no usual day to compare.
Daily totals, UTC
Attack events per UTC day, last 7 days (the first and last day are partial)
Day (UTC)EventsBusiest hourEvents that hour
6,08523:002,422
33,22014:003,688
32,44111:003,504
32,04410:003,144
32,03713:003,187
43,50313:003,968
52,80919:004,422
28,76609:002,839
Last 24 hours
39,101 events
1,760 addresses
Last 7 days
262,944 events
6,515 addresses
Since 9 Sep
1,847,980 events
27,722 addresses

Last attack UTC, 1 min ago. Updated UTC.

106,115 connection attempts from blocked addresses dropped at our firewalls since .

Is my IP here?

Live feed

The latest 15 bursts of attack traffic, one row per address, newest first. Times are UTC.
Time (UTC)AddressWhat happenedSeen byOutcome
-109.160.32.120173 req tried a username and password on a decoy remote login that never lets anyone in (+1 more kind)honeypot
180.212.27.234attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong passwordmail
187.93.68.178attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong passwordmail
176.103.15.195attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong passwordmail
128.185.208.42attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong passwordmail
-185.177.72.155 req · 2 paths swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner (+1 more kind)web
129.226.174.80requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask forhoneypot
175.210.10.97attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong passwordmail
39.164.91.67attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong passwordmail
172.98.33.15probed a WordPress admin/content path used to fingerprint the installation or hunt for an exposed upload/plugin surfaceweb
149.54.62.170attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong passwordmail
117.39.63.46attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong passwordmail
-222.210.35.19715 req tried a username and password on a decoy remote login that never lets anyone inhoneypot
103.230.176.152attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong passwordmail
1.250.67.190attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong passwordmail

One row per address, newest first: the latest 15 of the 50 most recent rows.

Blocked in the last hour 16

  1. 129.226.174.80BlockedScanning · cloud, Tencent Building, Kejizhongyi Avenue
  2. 109.160.32.120BlockedPassword guessing · home broadband, Banatsync Srl
  3. 35.196.183.67BlockedScanning · cloud, Google LLC
  4. 18.144.253.59BlockedHunting for secrets · cloud, Amazon.com, Inc.
  5. 165.22.59.117BlockedScanning · hosting, DigitalOcean, LLC
  6. 82.22.44.217BlockedHunting for secrets · home broadband, RCN
  7. 197.248.207.139BlockedPassword guessing · home broadband, Safaricom Limited
  8. 146.196.81.148BlockedScanning · home broadband, Cloudie Limited
  9. 80.240.246.208BlockedPassword guessing · home broadband, Rostelecom
  10. 20.87.214.225BlockedScanning · cloud, Microsoft Corporation
  11. 195.122.253.45BlockedPassword guessing · home broadband, MTS PJSC
  12. 152.42.200.7BlockedScanning · hosting, DigitalOcean, LLC
  13. 132.145.122.251BlockedPassword guessing · cloud, Oracle Corporation
  14. 172.176.125.150BlockedScanning · cloud, Microsoft Corporation
  15. 34.171.227.164BlockedScanning · cloud, Google LLC
  16. 5.102.169.100BlockedScanning · home broadband, CustodianDC Limited

Blocked on our servers’ firewalls within minutes of the attack (IPv4, and IPv6 where our servers support it; what a block stops). Every address here is in feed.txt.

Most Wanted

Right now

Top 20 addresses by current score (0 to 100), highest first
#AddressScoreStateNetworkSeen byLast seen (UTC)
12.57.122.202100Blocked ToolkitUnmanaged Ltdedge, web
220.211.97.120100Blocked ToolkitMicrosoft Corporationedge, web
320.217.186.29100Blocked ToolkitMicrosoft Corporationedge, web
434.62.116.145100Blocked ToolkitGoogle LLCedge, web
545.138.12.16100Blocked ToolkitTc Datacenter Limitededge, honeypot, web
645.138.12.19100Blocked ToolkitTc Datacenter Limitededge, honeypot, web
745.138.12.42100Blocked ToolkitTc Datacenter Limitededge, honeypot, web
845.138.12.44100Blocked ToolkitTc Datacenter Limitededge, honeypot, web
945.138.12.216100Blocked Campaign memberTc Datacenter Limitededge, web
1045.138.12.217100Blocked Campaign memberTc Datacenter Limitededge, web
1145.148.10.13100Blocked ToolkitTechoff Srv Limitededge, web
1245.148.10.64100Blocked ToolkitTechoff Srv Limitededge, honeypot, web
1345.148.10.120100Blocked ToolkitTechoff Srv Limitededge, web
1485.11.167.160100BlockedTechTies Inc.edge, web
1593.123.109.230100Blocked ToolkitTechoff Srv Limitededge, web
16102.220.160.173100Blocked ToolkitVPS Dedicated LLCedge, web
17169.40.142.177100Blocked ToolkitZkillu SASedge, web
18185.218.86.14100Blocked ToolkitTc Datacenter Limitededge, web
19193.32.162.175100BlockedUnmanaged Ltdedge, honeypot, web
20194.180.49.41100Blocked ToolkitMEVSPACE sp. z o.o.edge, honeypot, web

Score: the current score out of 100, reputation only (a block does not depend on it); every address here is at level Wanted; every one carries Regular.

All time

Top 20 addresses by all-time score (0 to 100), highest first
#AddressScoreWorst levelRequestsActive daysTimes blockedFirst seenLast seenState
145.148.10.12074Wanted1,438611Blocked
293.123.109.24773Wanted27,109131Blocked
345.148.10.24473Wanted10,997311Blocked
445.138.12.1669Wanted3,431261Blocked
5124.168.251.24268Brute9,91811Blocked
645.138.12.2468Wanted8,506171Blocked
745.138.12.668Wanted1,670361Blocked
8195.178.110.24267Wanted3,302231Blocked
9102.220.163.24167Wanted7,365171Blocked
1034.34.129.1467Persistent46,12521Blocked
11195.178.110.2267Wanted10,783101Blocked
12195.178.110.10267Wanted5,590201Blocked
13195.178.110.22867Persistent15,904171Blocked
1445.148.10.2167Wanted3,180211Blocked
15207.175.237.266Persistent38,09121Blocked
1645.138.12.2266Wanted5,181181Blocked
17195.178.110.19966Wanted3,659191Blocked
1834.95.243.12265Persistent10,10031Blocked
19195.178.110.13565Wanted4,993151Blocked
2092.118.39.1465Persistent11,721181Blocked

All-time score out of 100, kept after the 90-day evidence window: recent attacks count most (each request counts half as much after 30 days), plus days active, kinds of service attacked and times blocked. Only addresses that were blocked at least once. How it is computed

Breakdowns

Attack types, 7 days: hunting for secrets leads with 114,425 of 262,944
Attack events by type, last 7 days
Attack typeEventsShare
hunting for secrets114,425
scanning85,313
password guessing43,541
password spraying8,238
scanning tools4,028
injection3,328
known exploits1,986
unclassified1,142
leaked-password reuse565
mail relay probing247
flooding88
fake crawlers35
open proxy probing8
By surface
Attack events by surface and type, last 7 days
SurfaceAttack typeEvents
web-apphunting for secrets110,792
sshscanning53,744
sshpassword guessing36,215
web-appscanning24,056
web-apppassword spraying8,085
honeypotscanning7,068
web-appscanning tools3,907
mail-smtppassword guessing3,789
honeypothunting for secrets3,633
web-appinjection3,110
web-appknown exploits1,890
web-apppassword guessing1,077
web-appunclassified1,028
ftppassword guessing942
mail-imap-poppassword guessing769
dbpassword guessing749
honeypotleaked-password reuse565
mail-smtpscanning445
mail-smtpmail relay probing247
honeypotinjection218
mail-imap-poppassword spraying151
sshunclassified114
honeypotknown exploits96
honeypotscanning tools90
web-appflooding86
web-appfake crawlers35
sshscanning tools31
honeypotopen proxy probing8
honeypotpassword spraying2
honeypotflooding2
What they tried, 7 days: top 12 kinds
Attack events by kind, last 7 days, top 12
Kind of requestEventsShare
Requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials67,298
Typed a command into a decoy shell that is not connected to anything real53,668
Tried a username and password on a decoy remote login that never lets anyone in36,215
Requested a database dump or site archive by its common backup filename13,880
Fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds9,842
Requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot8,768
Requested xmlrpc.php, which exposes a multicall method commonly abused to spray WordPress credentials and relay pingback floods8,087
Requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for6,889
Requested a WordPress core file used to fingerprint the installed version and active plugins4,849
Requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable4,671
Attempted to authenticate to the mail server with a wrong password4,304
Requested phpinfo.php, which dumps the full PHP configuration and environment if left in place3,559
Networks: Google LLC leads with 4,512 addresses
Networks with the most attacking addresses, all addresses on record
ASNOrganisationAddressesShare
AS396982Google LLC4,512
AS16276OVH SAS3,206
AS14061DigitalOcean, LLC2,476
AS8075Microsoft Corporation1,580
AS206092F.n.s. Holdings Limited778
AS14618Amazon.com, Inc.775
AS132203Tencent Building, Kejizhongyi Avenue728
AS32934Facebook, Inc.712
AS22773Cox Communications Inc.554
AS25369Hydra Communications Ltd508
Countries: United States leads with 12,278 addresses
Countries with the most attacking addresses, all addresses on record (registry country)
CountryAddressesShare
United States US12,278
United Kingdom GB2,955
Singapore SG1,682
China CN1,639
France FR1,520
India IN1,473
Germany DE1,198
The Netherlands NL1,193
Brazil BR1,096
Belgium BE921

Campaigns

20 groups of addresses sharing one user agent and the same paths
Campaigns, most addresses first
AddressesUser agentPaths requestedSurfacesFirst seenLast seen
51browser claim/xmlrpc.phphoneypot, web-app
20browser claim/wp-login.php /wp-json/batch/v1honeypot, web-app
19browser claim/news.php?web-app
17browser claim/wp-login.phphoneypot, web-app
17browser claim/wp-login.phphoneypot, web-app
15browser claim/xmlrpc.phphoneypot, web-app
14other//cgi-bin/cgi-bin/cgi-bin/cgi-bin/cache.phpweb-app
14browser claim/wp-login.phphoneypot, web-app
14browser claim/wp-login.php
12browser claim/wp-login.phphoneypot, web-app
12declared bot/honeypot, mail-smtp, ssh
11browser claim/wp-login.phphoneypot, web-app
10browser claim//wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml //xmlrpc.php? //blog/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml //web/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml //wordpress/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xmlhoneypot, web-app
10browser claim/wp-login.php /xmlrpc.phphoneypot, web-app
10python/license.txtweb-app
10browser claim/wp-login.phphoneypot, ssh, web-app
9browser claim//wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml //xmlrpc.php? //blog/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml //web/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml //wordpress/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xmlweb-app
7browser claim/honeypot, web-app
7browser claim/wp-admin/web-app
7browser claim/wp-login.phphoneypot, web-app

User agent is the family of the string the requests sent (a browser string is only a claim). Paths are shown without their query strings.

AI crawlers, last 30 days

134,398 requests from 11 crawlers

Requests whose user agent claims to be one of these crawlers. Facts only: none of these numbers scores or blocks an address. Columns are defined on the about page.

AI crawler requests, last 30 days, busiest first
CrawlerRequestsAdmin or sensitive pathsOrdinary pagesAddresses, rDNS matchesAddresses, no matchBlocked at edgeReached the servers we watch
ClaudeBot24,92017,0537,8670467024,920
PetalBot19,824119,823770019,824
Meta-ExternalAgent18,9365,73313,2030897018,936
PerplexityBot15,48111,2404,2410423015,481
Amazonbot13,0325,4447,5880829013,032
GPTBot11,0795,7115,3680425011,079
Bytespider7,9235,6162,307439607,923
DeepSeekBot7,9045,6682,236041507,904
CCBot7,7145,6272,087040107,714
cohere-ai7,5605,4732,087039507,560
Google-Extended/GoogleOther25025019025

Hoster responses, ranked

Abuse reports we sent, per abuse contact, and what came back. Ranked by resolved share, then acknowledged share, then reports sent.

Abuse reports sent per hoster and their answers, ranked by resolved share
#HosterReports sentAcknowledgedResolvedResolved %
1[email protected]989800%
2[email protected]161600%
3[email protected]111100%
4[email protected]9900%
5[email protected]4400%
6[email protected]3300%
7[email protected]3300%
8[email protected]3300%
9[email protected]3300%
10[email protected]2200%
11[email protected]2200%
12[email protected]2200%
13[email protected]1100%
14[email protected]1100%
15[email protected]1100%
16[email protected]1100%
17[email protected]1100%
18[email protected]1100%
19[email protected]1100%
20[email protected]1100%

Credentials board

Aggregate counts only, never tied to an address.

Top usernames

  1. root 89,861
  2. admin 10,397
  3. 1 9,389
  4. ubuntu 9,156
  5. user 3,543
  6. deploy 2,441
  7. test 2,362
  8. postgres 1,827
  9. 345gs5662d34 1,743

Top passwords

  1. 123456 9,162
  2. 5,816
  3. 4,863
  4. 1234 4,024
  5. 12345678 2,591
  6. 2,528
  7. 2,426
  8. password 2,213
  9. 12345 2,104
  10. 2,034

Weekly digests

Each week in numbers: requests, addresses, networks, what they tried, new blocks. Atom feed

  • Week 46 of 2026 9 Nov to 15 Nov 2026 · 265,789 requests, 5,492 addresses, 2,182 new blocks
  • Week 45 of 2026 2 Nov to 8 Nov 2026 · 306,962 requests, 4,670 addresses, 2,054 new blocks
  • Week 44 of 2026 26 Oct to 1 Nov 2026 · 321,450 requests, 4,403 addresses, 1,915 new blocks
  • Week 43 of 2026 19 Oct to 25 Oct 2026 · 269,474 requests, 6,696 addresses, 3,012 new blocks
  • Week 42 of 2026 12 Oct to 18 Oct 2026 · 190,885 requests, 3,809 addresses, 4,471 new blocks
  • Week 41 of 2026 5 Oct to 11 Oct 2026 · 242,146 requests, 2,926 addresses, 342 new blocks
  • Week 40 of 2026 28 Sep to 4 Oct 2026 · 153,654 requests, 2,212 addresses, 309 new blocks
  • Week 39 of 2026 21 Sep to 27 Sep 2026 · 7,632 requests, 549 addresses, 0 new blocks
  • Week 38 of 2026 14 Sep to 20 Sep 2026 · 9,386 requests, 602 addresses, 0 new blocks
  • Week 37 of 2026 7 Sep to 13 Sep 2026 · 5,167 requests, 362 addresses, 0 new blocks

Feeds

feed.txt, 14,956 addresses, updated UTC

Free, no account, no warranty. Regenerated within minutes of a new block; each file answers conditional requests (ETag, Last-Modified), so polling costs a 304. Feed terms

A block has no end date: it stays on the list until we lift it ourselves. feed.txt carries IPv4 addresses first, then a comment line, then IPv6 prefixes; load only the IPv4 part into an IPv4 set. The week in numbers: weekly digest feed (Atom). In a terminal: Teletype report.

Published feed files with their address counts and generation times (UTC)
FileWhat’s in itWho it’s forAddressesUpdated (UTC)
feed.txtEvery blocked address, IPv4 first, then a comment line, then IPv6 as /64 prefixes, one per lineAnyone: load it into a firewall (CSF, pfSense, ipset, Cloudflare list)14,956
feed.jsonEvery blocked address with score, network, first and last seen, classes, dossier link and historyScripts and SIEMs15,277
released.txtAddresses we stopped blocking in the last 14 days, one per line with the time and the reason (owner)Anyone who loads the block list and wants to lift blocks promptly. A release means we stopped blocking this address. It is not a clearance and says nothing about the address today.0
vocab-v1.jsonThe surface and attack-type words used in the filesAnyone decoding feed.json

Verify before you load

Every file has a detached signature next to it (feed.txt.minisig and so on). Signing key id 9d1640d9d818429c, also published at pubkey.minisig.

minisign -Vm feed.txt -P RWSdFkDZ2BhCnFMaPrwsWM2kuzOMB/LPb79AdntSMH5cdVI/ucFTfP2K

Use the list

pfSense (pfBlockerNG)
IPv4 tab, add a custom list:
URL:     https://servbg.com/feeds/threats/feed.txt
Update:  every hour
Action:  Deny Inbound
OPNsense (URL Table alias) check on your product
Firewall > Aliases > Add
Type:     URL Table (IPs)
Content:  https://servbg.com/feeds/threats/feed.txt
Refresh:  1 hour
Then use the alias as the source of a block rule on WAN.

Not tested on this product by us; read it against your version’s documentation before you use it.

CSF
Add one line to csf.blocklists (0 = every line):
SERVBGWANTED|3600|0|https://servbg.com/feeds/threats/feed.txt
In csf.conf: LF_IPSET = "1" and LF_IPSET_MAXELEM = "1048576"
ipset + iptables
set -e
curl -fsS -o /tmp/wt.txt https://servbg.com/feeds/threats/feed.txt
ipset list -n servbg_wanted >/dev/null 2>&1 || ipset create servbg_wanted hash:ip maxelem 1048576
ipset destroy servbg_wanted_new 2>/dev/null || true
ipset create servbg_wanted_new hash:ip maxelem 1048576
grep -E '^[0-9.]+$' /tmp/wt.txt | sed 's/^/add servbg_wanted_new /' | ipset restore -exist
ipset swap servbg_wanted_new servbg_wanted
ipset destroy servbg_wanted_new
iptables -N SERVBG_WANTED 2>/dev/null || true
iptables -F SERVBG_WANTED
iptables -A SERVBG_WANTED -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j RETURN
iptables -A SERVBG_WANTED -p tcp --dport 22 -j RETURN
iptables -A SERVBG_WANTED -j DROP
iptables -C INPUT -m set --match-set servbg_wanted src -j SERVBG_WANTED 2>/dev/null \
  || iptables -I INPUT -m set --match-set servbg_wanted src -j SERVBG_WANTED
nftables check on your product
nft add table inet servbg
nft add set inet servbg wanted '{ type ipv4_addr; flags interval; }'
nft add chain inet servbg input '{ type filter hook input priority -10; }'
nft add rule inet servbg input ip saddr @wanted drop
curl -fsS https://servbg.com/feeds/threats/feed.txt | grep -E '^[0-9.]+$' \
  | { echo 'flush set inet servbg wanted'; printf 'add element inet servbg wanted { '; paste -sd, -; echo ' }'; } \
  | nft -f -

Not tested on this product by us; read it against your version’s documentation before you use it.

IPv6 networks appear in feed.txt as /64 lines, after the IPv4 addresses. CSF and OPNsense load both; the ipset and nftables snippets load the IPv4 lines.

The ipset version returns established connections and SSH (change 22 to your port) before it drops. More notes on the about page. Keep your own management port reachable before you load any list.

Every listing carries its evidence on its page, and blocks are lifted only by us; if you were blocked and have fixed the cause, write to abuse-reports@abuse.servbg.com.