87.192.41.180
Blocked Brute Regular
Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.
Record
- Score
- 35/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
- Worst level
- Brute
- Attack-shaped requests
- 14all time
- Active days
- 2UTC days
- First seen
- Last seen
- Servers hit
- 1
- Targets
- 0sites
- Times blocked
- 1by the evidence rules
First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.
Recorded 14 attack-shaped requests across 2 separate days.
Its traffic used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (12 requests); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2).
Seen by our honeypot sensor.
Scored into the "Brute" level, its highest so far. Badge: Regular.
Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 7 requests.
Routed via AS218751 (Fontaine, LLC), a home broadband network.
Surfaces: honeypot. Attack types: injection, hunting for secrets. Seen by: honeypot.
Activity, last 90 days
Active on 2 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.
Daily counts
| Day (UTC) | Requests |
|---|---|
| 7 | |
| 7 |
- At least 7 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
- Methods: GET 14.
- The servers we watch answered: 404 14 (totals only, from our web servers).
Evidence
Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.
| Time | Site | What happened | Request | User agent | Seen by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (6 distinct paths) | GET /%2e%2e%2f.claude%2f.credentials.json | honeypot | |||
| requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /.claude/.credentials.json | honeypot | |||
| 6× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (6 distinct paths) | GET /%2e%2e%2f.claude%2f.credentials.json | honeypot | |||
| requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /.claude/.credentials.json | honeypot | |||
Network
- ASN
- AS218751 Fontaine, LLC
- Network type
- home broadband
- Reverse DNS
- none
- Country
- The Netherlands NL
- Flags
- none observed
- Abuse contact
- found in the registry
- Checked
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