80.94.95.211

Blocked Brute Night Owl Toolkit

Blocked since 17 Oct 2026 05:27 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 42/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Brute
Attack-shaped requests: 263all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 17 Oct 2026
Last seen: 17 Oct 2026 06:15
Servers hit: 1
Targets: 0sites
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 17 Oct 2026 05:21 UTC, most recently active on 17 Oct 2026 06:15 UTC.

Recorded 263 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (147 requests); it also requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (77); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (12).

Seen by our honeypot sensor.

Scored into the "Brute" level, its highest so far. Badges: Night Owl and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 17 Oct 2026 05:00 UTC, with 258 requests.

Routed via AS204428 (SS-Net), a home broadband network.

Surfaces: honeypot. Attack types: injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: honeypot.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 17 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
17 Oct 2026	263

At least 55 requests a minute at its peak (17 Oct 2026 05:24 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 263.
The servers we watch answered: 404 258, 200 5 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	What happened	Request	Seen by
17 Oct 2026
06:15	requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for	`GET /`	honeypot
06:15	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env`	honeypot
06:15	2× requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (2 distinct paths)	`GET /r325i019fnvn0w`	honeypot
06:15	requested a database dump or site archive by its common backup filename	`GET /site.zip`	honeypot
05:27	requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for	`GET /`	honeypot
05:27	12× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (12 distinct paths)	`GET /_static/.env`	honeypot
05:27	requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for	`GET /.env_1`	honeypot
05:27	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.docker/.env`	honeypot
05:26	requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for	`GET /.env.dev.local`	honeypot
05:26	6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (6 distinct paths)	`GET /development/.env`	honeypot
05:26	requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for	`GET /.env.development.local`	honeypot
05:26	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /conf/.env`	honeypot
05:26	2× requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.env_sample`	honeypot
05:26	5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.dist`	honeypot
05:26	2× requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (2 distinct paths)	`GET /var/.env.local.php`	honeypot
05:26	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /test/.env.php`	honeypot
05:26	requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for	`GET /.env.php.backup`	honeypot
05:26	4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.php-backup`	honeypot
05:26	4× requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (4 distinct paths)	`GET /config.dev.php`	honeypot
05:26	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /env-config.js`	honeypot

Network

ASN: AS204428 SS-Net
Network type: home broadband
Reverse DNS: none
Country: Romania RO
Flags: none observed
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 17 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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