8.235.126.53
In feed.txt Persistent Regular Toolkit
Blocked on our servers, including web requests through Cloudflare, since UTC, through UTC, and in feed.txt.
Record
- Score
- 44/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
- Worst level
- Persistent
- Attack-shaped requests
- 422all time
- Active days
- 2UTC days
- First seen
- Last seen
- Servers hit
- 3
- Targets
- 2sites
- Times blocked
- 0by the evidence rules
Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials; it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root; it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot.
Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.
Activity, last 90 days
Active on 2 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: to .
Daily counts
| Day (UTC) | Requests |
|---|---|
| 204 | |
| 218 |
- At least 218 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
- Methods: GET 348, POST 30.
- The servers we watch answered: 403 231, 404 181 (totals only, from our web servers).
Evidence
Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.
| Time | Site | What happened | Request | User agent | Seen by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| servbg.com | 2× fuzzed a common filename under /cgi-bin/, looking for a forgotten legacy CGI script | /cgi-bin | none | web | |
| servbg.com | 2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths) | POST /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | /index.php | none | web | |
| servbg.com | 2× fuzzed a common filename under /cgi-bin/, looking for a forgotten legacy CGI script | /cgi-bin | none | web | |
| servbg.com | fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | /index.php | none | web | |
| servbg.com | fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | POST /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths) | POST /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe? | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | POST /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open | /actuator | none | web | |
| servbg.com | 2× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (2 distinct paths) | POST /api/auth | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.com | probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open | GET /actuator/mappings | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 2× requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable | /.git | none | web | |
| servbg.com | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /assets../.env | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 2× requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings (2 distinct paths) | GET /docker-compose.yml | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 3× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (3 distinct paths) | GET /static../.env | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /credentials.json | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /secrets.env | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config | GET /.git/HEAD | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 3× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (3 distinct paths) | GET /.git-credentials | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config | GET /.git/config | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /.aws/config | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated | /config | none | web | |
| servbg.com | probed a list of common site paths looking for an unprotected admin panel or staging copy | /admin | none | web | |
| servbg.com | 4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths) | GET /dist/.env | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake | GET /.aws/credentials | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 10× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (10 distinct paths) | GET /docker/.env | declared bot | web | |
Network
- ASN
- AS396982 Google LLC
- Network type
- cloud
- Reverse DNS
53.126.235.8.bc.googleusercontent.com- Country
- United States US
- City
- The Dalles (registry location of a hosting network)
- Flags
- cloud range (GCP)
- Abuse contact
- found in the registry
- Checked