45.148.10.5
Blocked Persistent Regular Toolkit
Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.
Record
- Score
- 53/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
- Worst level
- Persistent
- Attack-shaped requests
- 239all time
- Active days
- 7UTC days
- First seen
- Last seen
- Servers hit
- 2
- Targets
- 1site
- Times blocked
- 1by the evidence rules
First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.
Recorded 239 attack-shaped requests across 7 separate days.
Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (108 requests); it also requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (92); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (12); 1 request matched no known pattern.
Seen by our edge and honeypot sensors, against victorantonov.com.
Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badges: Regular and Toolkit.
Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 57 requests.
Routed via AS48090 (Techoff Srv Limited), a hosting network.
Surfaces: honeypot, mail-smtp. Attack types: password guessing, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, honeypot.
Activity, last 90 days
Active on 7 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.
Daily counts
| Day (UTC) | Requests |
|---|---|
| 2 | |
| 57 | |
| 3 | |
| 57 | |
| 6 | |
| 57 | |
| 57 |
- At least 57 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
- Methods: GET 228, POST 2.
- The servers we watch answered: 404 220, 200 8 (totals only, from our web servers).
Evidence
Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.
| Time | Site | What happened | Request | User agent | Seen by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake | GET /.aws/credentials | honeypot | |||
| requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for | GET /core/.git/config | honeypot | |||
| 5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths) | GET /.env.test | honeypot | |||
| requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for | GET /www/.git/config | honeypot | |||
| probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config | GET /.git/config | honeypot | |||
| requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /settings/.env | honeypot | |||
| requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for | GET /admin/.git/config | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /api/.env | honeypot | |||
| requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for | GET /.env.production.local | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /configuration/.env | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (2 distinct paths) | GET /.env.dev.local | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /.env.uat | honeypot | |||
| requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings | GET /docker-compose.prod.yml | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (2 distinct paths) | GET /src/.git/config | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /config/.env | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (2 distinct paths) | GET /media/.git/config | honeypot | |||
| used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /static../.git/config | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (2 distinct paths) | GET /server/.git/config | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /.env.testing | honeypot | |||
| requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for | GET /public/.git/config | honeypot | |||
| 3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths) | GET /.env.save | honeypot | |||
| requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /.env | honeypot | |||
| requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for | GET /files/.git/config | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /prod/.env | honeypot | |||
| requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for | GET /.env.staging.local | honeypot | |||
| requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /.env.secret | honeypot | |||
| used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /assets../.git/config | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /.env.dev | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (2 distinct paths) | GET /dev/.git/config | honeypot | |||
| used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /media../.git/config | honeypot | |||
| requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings | GET /config.json | honeypot | |||
| requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /.env.bak | honeypot | |||
Network
- ASN
- AS48090 Techoff Srv Limited
- Network type
- hosting
- Reverse DNS
- none
- Country
- The Netherlands NL
- Flags
- none observed
- Abuse contact
- found in the registry
- Checked
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