35.234.8.11

Blocked Scanner Toolkit

Blocked since 17 Oct 2026 16:55 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 43/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Brute
Attack-shaped requests: 196all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 29 Sep 2026
Last seen: 29 Sep 2026 19:31
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 1by the evidence rules

First seen on 29 Sep 2026 19:30 UTC, most recently active on 29 Sep 2026 19:31 UTC.

Recorded 196 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (86 requests); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (25); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (19); 6 requests matched no known pattern.

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against zmey.eu.

Scored into the "Scanner" level now; the highest it has reached is "Brute". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 29 Sep 2026 19:00 UTC, with 196 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 17 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
29 Sep 2026	196

At least 186 requests a minute at its peak (29 Sep 2026 19:30 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 176, POST 14.
The servers we watch answered: 404 173, 403 21 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
29 Sep 2026
19:31	zmey.eu	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
19:31	zmey.eu	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
19:31	zmey.eu	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
19:31	zmey.eu	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?`	declared bot	web
19:31	zmey.eu	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
19:31	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`/.env`	none	web
19:31	zmey.eu	claimed to be Googlebot while POSTing, something the real crawler never does	`POST /icecoder/lib/terminal-xhr.php`	declared bot	web
19:31	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env?`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /instance/config.py`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.local?`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /document.php?`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.swp`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /env.old`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /config.env`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /api/w/default/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environ`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /__nuxt_config.json`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.test`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open	`GET /actuator/gateway/routes`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`GET /api/config`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /_image?`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.production.bak`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open	`GET /actuator/loggers`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /admin/_payload.json`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.docker`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw	`GET /@fs/proc/self/environ?`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	requested a database dump or site archive by its common backup filename	`GET /env.bak`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths)	`GET /portal/.env`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/console/api_server?`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /services/.env`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /config/settings.py`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /site/.env`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open	`GET /actuator/beans`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.development?`	declared bot	web
19:30	zmey.eu	probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open	`GET /actuator/mappings`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 11.8.234.35.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Taiwan TW
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 17 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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