35.203.39.68

Blocked Scanner Toolkit

Blocked since 17 Oct 2026 16:55 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 50/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 786all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 6 Oct 2026
Last seen: 6 Oct 2026 15:53
Servers hit: 4
Targets: 4sites
Times blocked: 1by the evidence rules

First seen on 6 Oct 2026 09:59 UTC, most recently active on 6 Oct 2026 15:53 UTC.

Recorded 786 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (273 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (148); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (88).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against 4 of the sites we watch: motoristi.eu, techauthors.eu, techwriters.eu and zmey.eu.

Scored into the "Scanner" level now; the highest it has reached is "Persistent". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 6 Oct 2026 15:00 UTC, with 595 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 17 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
6 Oct 2026	786

At least 200 requests a minute at its peak (6 Oct 2026 15:07 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 704, POST 49.
The servers we watch answered: 404 676, 403 99 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
6 Oct 2026
15:53	zmey.eu	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	2× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`/api`	none	web
15:53	zmey.eu	2× requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable	`/.git`	none	web
15:53	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.js`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	claimed to be Googlebot while POSTing, something the real crawler never does	`POST /icecoder/lib/terminal-xhr.php`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.git-credentials`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/HEAD`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yaml`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/config`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yml`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.aws/config`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /.aws/credentials`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /core/.env`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /credentials.json`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.next/.env`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /secrets.json`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /docker/.env`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /secrets.yml`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	13× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (13 distinct paths)	`GET /frontend/.env`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.old`	declared bot	web
15:53	zmey.eu	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /gcp-credentials.json`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 68.39.203.35.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Canada CA
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 13 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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