35.201.196.23

Blocked Brute Toolkit

Blocked since 8 Oct 2026 17:52 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 42/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 320all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 8 Oct 2026
Last seen: 8 Oct 2026 19:33
Servers hit: 3
Targets: 3sites
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 8 Oct 2026 17:49 UTC, most recently active on 8 Oct 2026 19:33 UTC.

Recorded 320 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (90 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (42); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (31).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against 3 of the sites we watch: haiv.dev, haived.com and servbg.dev.

Scored into the "Brute" level now; the highest it has reached is "Persistent". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 8 Oct 2026 19:00 UTC, with 216 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 8 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
8 Oct 2026	320

At least 104 requests a minute at its peak (8 Oct 2026 17:49 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 277, POST 45.
The servers we watch answered: 403 215, 404 90 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
8 Oct 2026
19:33	haived.com	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	2× claimed to be Googlebot while POSTing, something the real crawler never does (2 distinct paths)	`POST /api/templates/preview`	declared bot	web
19:33	servbg.dev	4× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (4 distinct paths)	`POST /admin`	declared bot	edge
19:33	haived.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/../.env?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/src/.env?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	2× used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	8× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (6 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/app/.env.production?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /@fs/home/ubuntu/.aws/credentials?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/../.env?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /@fs/root/.aws/credentials?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252fproc/self/environ?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /@fs/home/ec2-user/.aws/credentials?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/src/.env?`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_rsa`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes	`GET /.htpasswd`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_ed25519`	declared bot	web
19:33	haived.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.ssh/config`	declared bot	web
19:32	haived.com	2× requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings (2 distinct paths)	`GET /docker-compose.yaml`	declared bot	web
19:32	haived.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /credentials.json`	declared bot	web
19:32	haived.com	probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/HEAD`	declared bot	web
19:32	haived.com	3× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (3 distinct paths)	`GET /secrets.yml`	declared bot	web
19:32	haived.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /secrets.env`	declared bot	web
19:32	haived.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.aws/config`	declared bot	web
19:32	haived.com	probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/config`	declared bot	web
19:32	haived.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /build/.env`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 23.196.201.35.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Taiwan TW
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 15 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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