35.201.188.216

Blocked Script Kiddie Night Owl Toolkit

Blocked since 17 Oct 2026 16:54 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 42/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Scanner
Attack-shaped requests: 161all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 29 Sep 2026
Last seen: 29 Sep 2026 05:54
Servers hit: 1
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 1by the evidence rules

First seen on 29 Sep 2026 05:53 UTC, most recently active on 29 Sep 2026 05:54 UTC.

Recorded 161 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (92 requests); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (15); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (11).

Seen by our web sensor, against dveli.com.

Scored into the "Script Kiddie" level now; the highest it has reached is "Scanner". Badges: Night Owl and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 29 Sep 2026 05:00 UTC, with 161 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 17 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
29 Sep 2026	161

At least 97 requests a minute at its peak (29 Sep 2026 05:54 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 161.
The servers we watch answered: 404 154, 403 13 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
29 Sep 2026
05:54	dveli.com	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`GET /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`GET /index.php?`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code	`GET /cgi-bin/php-cgi.exe?`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`GET /index.php?`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	probed a list of common site paths looking for an unprotected admin panel or staging copy	`GET /admin`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths)	`GET /private/.env`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /app-config.json`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /shop/.env`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /runtime-config.js`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (6 distinct paths)	`GET /cmd/.env`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	2× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated (2 distinct paths)	`GET /api/v1/config`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths)	`GET /pipeline/.env`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /firebase-config.json`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /agents/.env`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`GET /api/config`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)	`GET /project/.env`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings	`GET /config.json`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /api/.env`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /awsConfig.js`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.save`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /awsconfiguration.json`	declared bot	web
05:54	dveli.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.backup`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 216.188.201.35.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Taiwan TW
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 12 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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