35.194.236.184
Blocked Scanner Toolkit
Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.
Record
- Score
- 51/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
- Worst level
- Persistent
- Attack-shaped requests
- 1,072all time
- Active days
- 1UTC days
- First seen
- Last seen
- Servers hit
- 2
- Targets
- 2sites
- Times blocked
- 1by the evidence rules
First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.
Recorded 1,072 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.
Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (333 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (203); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (106).
Seen by our edge and web sensors, against 2 of the sites we watch: haiv.dev and haived.com.
Scored into the "Scanner" level now; the highest it has reached is "Persistent". Badge: Toolkit.
Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 965 requests.
Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.
Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.
Activity, last 90 days
Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.
Daily counts
| Day (UTC) | Requests |
|---|---|
| 1,072 |
- At least 178 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
- Methods: GET 965, POST 112.
- The servers we watch answered: 404 963, 403 66, 499 2 (totals only, from our web servers).
Evidence
Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.
| Time | Site | What happened | Request | User agent | Seen by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| haived.com | 2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths) | POST /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | POST /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths) | POST /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | POST /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| haiv.dev | 4× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (4 distinct paths) | POST /api/auth | declared bot | edge | |
| haived.com | 2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /userfiles? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /api/system/fileView? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /cache/original/%2e%2e/.env | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw | GET /api/system/fileView? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /cache/original/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.env | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /api/fs/read? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw | GET /api/fs/read? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 7× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (6 distinct paths) | GET /api/w/starter/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environ | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 7× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (7 distinct paths) | GET /settings%2F.env | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /css../.env | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /static//app/.env | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths) | GET /js../.env | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /static//.env | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 6× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (6 distinct paths) | GET /img../.env | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 2× fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds (2 distinct paths) | GET /test.php | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested phpinfo.php, which dumps the full PHP configuration and environment if left in place | GET /phpinfo.php | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | GET /info.php | declared bot | web | |
Network
- ASN
- AS396982 Google LLC
- Network type
- cloud
- Reverse DNS
184.236.194.35.bc.googleusercontent.com- Country
- Taiwan TW
- Flags
- cloud range (GCP)
- Abuse contact
- found in the registry
- Checked
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