35.194.126.119
Blocked Scanner Toolkit
Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.
Record
- Score
- 40/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
- Worst level
- Brute
- Attack-shaped requests
- 102all time
- Active days
- 1UTC days
- First seen
- Last seen
- Servers hit
- 2
- Targets
- 1site
- Times blocked
- 1by the evidence rules
First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.
Recorded 102 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.
Its traffic requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (20 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (14); it also requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (10); 1 request matched no known pattern.
Seen by our edge and web sensors, against victorantonov.com.
Scored into the "Scanner" level now; the highest it has reached is "Brute". Badge: Toolkit.
Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 102 requests.
Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.
Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets, unclassified. Seen by: edge, web.
Activity, last 90 days
Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.
Daily counts
| Day (UTC) | Requests |
|---|---|
| 102 |
- At least 86 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
- Methods: GET 104.
- The servers we watch answered: 404 90, 301 2, 200 2, 403 1 (totals only, from our web servers).
Evidence
Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.
| Time | Site | What happened | Request | User agent | Seen by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| victorantonov.com | 2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths) | GET /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | GET /? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open | GET /actuator/gateway/routes | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | GET /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner | GET /api/v1/loginmethod? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | 2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths) | GET /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | GET /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated | GET /api/v1/configs | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | GET /? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | GET /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /admin%2F.env | declared bot | web | |
| - | victorantonov.com | 6× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (3 distinct paths) | GET /userfiles? | declared bot | web |
| victorantonov.com | 2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths) | GET /gcp-credentials.json | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw | GET /api/proc/self/environ | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | 2× made a request that matched no known pattern (2 distinct paths) | GET /api/system/fileView? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | 3× tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw (3 distinct paths) | GET /api/system/fileView? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /settings%2F.env | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | 2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths) | GET /firebase-credentials.json | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /userfiles? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /.env.old | declared bot | edge | |
| victorantonov.com | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /js../.env | declared bot | edge | |
| victorantonov.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /dashboard%2F.env | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw | GET /api/proc/self/environ | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | 3× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths) | GET /api/console/api_server? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source | GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /uploads../.env | declared bot | edge | |
| victorantonov.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /.ssh/config | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name | GET /.ssh/id_ed25519 | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | 2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths) | GET /secrets.yml | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name | GET /.ssh/id_rsa | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source | GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL? | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /secrets.json | declared bot | web | |
| victorantonov.com | requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake | GET /@fs/home/ec2-user/.aws/credentials? | declared bot | web | |
Network
- ASN
- AS396982 Google LLC
- Network type
- cloud
- Reverse DNS
119.126.194.35.bc.googleusercontent.com- Country
- Japan JP
- Flags
- cloud range (GCP)
- Abuse contact
- found in the registry
- Checked
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