35.189.185.106

Blocked Script Kiddie Toolkit

Blocked since 17 Oct 2026 16:54 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 41/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Scanner
Attack-shaped requests: 112all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 20 Sep 2026
Last seen: 20 Sep 2026 21:03
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 1by the evidence rules

First seen on 20 Sep 2026 21:02 UTC, most recently active on 20 Sep 2026 21:03 UTC.

Recorded 112 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (79 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (11); it also requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name (6); 2 requests matched no known pattern.

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against haived.com.

Scored into the "Script Kiddie" level now; the highest it has reached is "Scanner". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 20 Sep 2026 21:00 UTC, with 112 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 17 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
20 Sep 2026	112

At least 110 requests a minute at its peak (20 Sep 2026 21:02 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 109, POST 3.
The servers we watch answered: 301 109 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
20 Sep 2026
21:03	haived.com	2× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (2 distinct paths)	`POST /`	declared bot	edge
21:02	haived.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /@fs/root/.aws/credentials?`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	4× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (4 distinct paths)	`GET /uploads../.env`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /api/.env/public/.env`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	3× requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name (3 distinct paths)	`GET /id_ed25519`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.//.env`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_dsa`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.old`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_ed25519`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /etc/.env`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_rsa`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /conf/.env`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yml`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /static//app/.env`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yaml`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	probed for an exposed .svn directory to read the site's version-control metadata	`GET /.svn/entries`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes	`GET /.htpasswd`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	9× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (9 distinct paths)	`GET /.github/.env`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /files../.env`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (6 distinct paths)	`GET /assets/.env`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /media../.env`	declared bot	web
21:02	haived.com	6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (6 distinct paths)	`GET /dashboard/.env`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 106.185.189.35.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Taiwan TW
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 17 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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