35.185.177.150

Blocked Brute Toolkit

Blocked since 10 Oct 2026 18:27 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 47/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Brute
Attack-shaped requests: 928all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 10 Oct 2026
Last seen: 10 Oct 2026 20:06
Servers hit: 1
Targets: 4sites
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 10 Oct 2026 18:24 UTC, most recently active on 10 Oct 2026 20:06 UTC.

Recorded 928 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (473 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (147); it also swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner (82).

Seen by our web sensor, against 4 of the sites we watch: motoristi.eu, techauthors.eu, techwriters.eu and zmey.eu.

Scored into the "Brute" level, its highest so far. Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 10 Oct 2026 19:00 UTC, with 479 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 10 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
10 Oct 2026	928

At least 244 requests a minute at its peak (10 Oct 2026 20:06 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 811, POST 4.
The servers we watch answered: 403 728, 404 209 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
10 Oct 2026
20:06	zmey.eu	2× requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings (2 distinct paths)	`GET /docker-compose.yml`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /credentials.json`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	2× requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable	`/.git`	none	web
20:06	zmey.eu	requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`/config`	none	web
20:06	zmey.eu	probed a list of common site paths looking for an unprotected admin panel or staging copy	`/admin`	none	web
20:06	zmey.eu	swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`/api`	none	web
20:06	zmey.eu	2× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`/config`	none	web
20:06	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /secrets.env`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /secrets.yml`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/config`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.aws/config`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /core/.env`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /.aws/credentials`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/HEAD`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.git-credentials`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /build/.env`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /secrets.json`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	21× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (21 distinct paths)	`GET /.next/.env`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /push_config.json`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.local`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /config/gcp-credentials.json`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles?`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	3× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (3 distinct paths)	`GET /google-credentials.json`	declared bot	web
20:06	zmey.eu	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles/x?`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 150.177.185.35.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Singapore SG
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 17 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

Your verdict

What readers make of this address. Verdicts are opinions of signed-in Academy members. They never change blocking or reporting.

No verdicts yet.