34.91.87.50

Blocked Persistent Night Owl Toolkit

Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score
50/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level
Persistent
Attack-shaped requests
258all time
Active days
1UTC days
First seen
Last seen
Servers hit
2
Targets
1site
Times blocked
1by the evidence rules

First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.

Recorded 258 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (133 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (39); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (17); 1 request matched no known pattern.

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against servbg.com.

Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badges: Night Owl and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 258 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: honeypot, web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets, unclassified. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.

Daily counts
Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)Requests
258
  • At least 140 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
  • Methods: GET 254, POST 1.
  • The servers we watch answered: 403 183, 404 80, 200 4 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
TimeSiteWhat happenedRequestUser agentSeen by
servbg.com3× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated/confignoneweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /cache/original/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.envdeclared botedge
servbg.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /.envdeclared botedge
servbg.com10× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (10 distinct paths)GET /backend/.envdeclared botweb
servbg.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /push_config.jsondeclared botweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /userfiles/x?declared botweb
servbg.com9× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (9 distinct paths)GET /.env.olddeclared botweb
servbg.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /public/admin.jsondeclared botweb
servbg.com2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)GET /config/gcp-credentials.jsondeclared botweb
servbg.com3× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (3 distinct paths)GET /firebase-credentials.jsondeclared botweb
servbg.com5× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (5 distinct paths)GET /userfiles?declared botweb
servbg.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /gcp-credentials.jsondeclared botweb
servbg.com4× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)GET /userfiles?declared botweb
servbg.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/tokendeclared botweb
servbg.comtried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flawGET /api/system/fileView?declared botweb
servbg.com2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)GET /api/fs/read?declared botweb
servbg.comtried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flawGET /api/fs/read?declared botweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /cache/original/%2e%2e/.envdeclared botweb
servbg.com2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)GET /api/w/starter/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environdeclared botweb

Network

ASN
AS396982 Google LLC
Network type
cloud
Reverse DNS
50.87.91.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country
The Netherlands NL
Flags
cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact
found in the registry
Checked

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

Your verdict

What readers make of this address. Verdicts are opinions of signed-in Academy members. They never change blocking or reporting.

No verdicts yet.

Every listing carries its evidence on its page, and blocks are lifted only by us; if you were blocked and have fixed the cause, write to abuse-reports@abuse.servbg.com.