34.84.90.101
In feed.txt Persistent Regular Toolkit
Blocked on our servers, including web requests through Cloudflare, since UTC, through UTC, and in feed.txt.
Record
- Score
- 52/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
- Worst level
- Persistent
- Attack-shaped requests
- 2,110all time
- Active days
- 2UTC days
- First seen
- Last seen
- Servers hit
- 3
- Targets
- 3sites
- Times blocked
- 0by the evidence rules
First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.
Recorded 2,110 attack-shaped requests across 2 separate days.
Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (1,131 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (311); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (133); 16 requests matched no known pattern.
Seen by our edge and web sensors, against 3 of the sites we watch: haiv.dev, haived.com and servbg.dev.
Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badges: Regular and Toolkit.
Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 2,095 requests.
Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.
Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets, unclassified. Seen by: edge, web.
Activity, last 90 days
Active on 2 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: to .
Daily counts
| Day (UTC) | Requests |
|---|---|
| 2,095 | |
| 15 |
- At least 254 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
- Methods: GET 2,080, POST 123, DELETE 1.
- The servers we watch answered: 403 1,063, 404 1,041, 499 6, 302 6 (totals only, from our web servers).
Evidence
Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.
| Time | Site | What happened | Request | User agent | Seen by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| servbg.dev | tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code | POST /cgi-bin/php-cgi.exe | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | POST /index.php | declared bot | edge | |
| – | servbg.dev | 2× was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature (2 distinct paths) | POST /api/templates/preview | declared bot | edge |
| servbg.dev | was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature | DELETE /api/events | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name | GET /.ssh/id_ed25519 | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | 3× was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature (3 distinct paths) | GET /.env.prod.local | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | 4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths) | GET /api/..;/.env | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature | POST /login | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature | GET /register | browser claim | edge | |
| haiv.dev | tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code | POST /cgi-bin/php | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /userfiles/x | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature | POST /api | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /admin/.env | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | 2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths) | GET /css../.env | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /api/system/fileView | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name | GET /id_rsa | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | 4× was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature (4 distinct paths) | GET /supabase/config.toml | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | 2× was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature (2 distinct paths) | POST /exec-py | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | 2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths) | GET /cache/original/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.env | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET //.env | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /....//....//....//..../.env | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /.env.mail | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature | GET /.dockercfg | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /agents/.env | declared bot | edge | |
| haiv.dev | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /_nuxt/../.env | declared bot | edge | |
| haived.com | 2× requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings (2 distinct paths) | GET /docker-compose.yaml | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths) | GET /web/.env | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /.aws/config | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake | GET /.aws/credentials | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config | GET /.git/config | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | probed for an exposed GraphQL endpoint or its config file, often a precursor to an introspection query | POST /graphql | browser claim | web | |
| haived.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /credentials.json | declared bot | web | |
Network
- ASN
- AS396982 Google LLC
- Network type
- cloud
- Reverse DNS
101.90.84.34.bc.googleusercontent.com- Country
- Japan JP
- City
- Tokyo (registry location of a hosting network)
- Flags
- cloud range (GCP)
- Abuse contact
- found in the registry
- Checked
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