34.84.162.244

Blocked Persistent Night Owl Toolkit

Blocked since 17 Oct 2026 05:42 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 47/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 265all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 17 Oct 2026
Last seen: 17 Oct 2026 05:36
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 17 Oct 2026 05:35 UTC, most recently active on 17 Oct 2026 05:36 UTC.

Recorded 265 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (140 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (39); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (17).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against servbg.com.

Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badges: Night Owl and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 17 Oct 2026 05:00 UTC, with 265 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: honeypot, web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 17 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
17 Oct 2026	265

At least 165 requests a minute at its peak (17 Oct 2026 05:35 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 255, POST 1.
The servers we watch answered: 403 189, 404 80, 200 6 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
17 Oct 2026
05:36	servbg.com	requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`/config`	none	web
05:36	servbg.com	18× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (18 distinct paths)	`GET /packages/.env`	declared bot	web
05:36	servbg.com	2× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`/config`	none	web
05:36	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env`	declared bot	edge
05:36	servbg.com	6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (6 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.old`	declared bot	web
05:36	servbg.com	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /push_config.json`	declared bot	web
05:36	servbg.com	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /config/firebase-admin.json`	declared bot	web
05:36	servbg.com	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles/x?`	declared bot	web
05:36	servbg.com	4× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (4 distinct paths)	`GET /google-credentials.json`	declared bot	web
05:36	servbg.com	3× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles?`	declared bot	web
05:36	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /cache/original/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.env`	declared bot	edge
05:36	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/system/fileView?`	declared bot	web
05:36	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/w/starter/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environ`	declared bot	web
05:36	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`	declared bot	web
05:36	servbg.com	3× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (3 distinct paths)	`GET /api/console/api_server?`	declared bot	web
05:36	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/fs/read?`	declared bot	web
05:36	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles?`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 244.162.84.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Japan JP
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: not found
Checked: 17 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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