34.78.85.124
Blocked Brute Night Owl Toolkit
Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.
Record
- Score
- 39/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
- Worst level
- Persistent
- Attack-shaped requests
- 159all time
- Active days
- 1UTC days
- First seen
- Last seen
- Servers hit
- 2
- Targets
- 1site
- Times blocked
- 0by the evidence rules
First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.
Recorded 159 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.
Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (54 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (29); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (16); 5 requests matched no known pattern.
Seen by our edge and web sensors, against foundyourjob.com.
Scored into the "Brute" level now; the highest it has reached is "Persistent". Badges: Night Owl and Toolkit.
Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 159 requests.
Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.
Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets, unclassified. Seen by: edge, web.
Activity, last 90 days
Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.
Daily counts
| Day (UTC) | Requests |
|---|---|
| 159 |
- At least 159 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
- Methods: GET 150, POST 8.
- The servers we watch answered: 404 134, 403 16, 200 2 (totals only, from our web servers).
Evidence
Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.
| Time | Site | What happened | Request | User agent | Seen by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| foundyourjob.com | 2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths) | POST /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | POST /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | 2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths) | POST /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | POST /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | 3× was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature (3 distinct paths) | GET /sw.js | declared bot | edge | |
| foundyourjob.com | 2× fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds (2 distinct paths) | GET /pi.php | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | requested phpinfo.php, which dumps the full PHP configuration and environment if left in place | GET /phpinfo.php | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | GET /info.php | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | 2× probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open (2 distinct paths) | GET /actuator | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated | GET /api/v1/config | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open | GET /actuator/configprops | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | probed for an exposed GraphQL endpoint or its config file, often a precursor to an introspection query | GET /graphql | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated | GET /v1/onboarding/config? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open | GET /actuator/loggers | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | 2× requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable | /.git | none | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | 2× was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature (2 distinct paths) | GET /configuration.js | declared bot | edge | |
| foundyourjob.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /core/.env | declared bot | edge | |
| foundyourjob.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /app-config.json | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | 2× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated (2 distinct paths) | GET /api/v2/config | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /firebase-config.json | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings | GET /config.json | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | made a request that matched no known pattern | GET /%2Fapi/config | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | 4× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (4 distinct paths) | GET /_image? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /_nuxt/../.env | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /.env? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | 3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths) | GET /.env.local? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw | GET /@fs/proc/self/environ? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | 3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /.env.development? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /.env? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /.env.local? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /.env? | declared bot | web | |
| foundyourjob.com | 2× requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source | GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL? | declared bot | web | |
Network
- ASN
- AS396982 Google LLC
- Network type
- cloud
- Reverse DNS
124.85.78.34.bc.googleusercontent.com- Country
- Belgium BE
- Flags
- cloud range (GCP)
- Abuse contact
- found in the registry
- Checked
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