34.74.23.60

Blocked Scanner Night Owl Toolkit

Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score
40/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level
Persistent
Attack-shaped requests
115all time
Active days
1UTC days
First seen
Last seen
Servers hit
2
Targets
1site
Times blocked
1by the evidence rules

First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.

Recorded 115 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (21 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (21); it also requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (11); 2 requests matched no known pattern.

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against victorantonov.com.

Scored into the "Scanner" level now; the highest it has reached is "Persistent". Badges: Night Owl and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 115 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets, unclassified. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.

Daily counts
Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)Requests
115
  • At least 97 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
  • Methods: GET 108, POST 8.
  • The servers we watch answered: 404 105, 200 2, 403 1 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
TimeSiteWhat happenedRequestUser agentSeen by
victorantonov.com2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)POST /cgi-bin/php?declared botweb
victorantonov.comtried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_includePOST /index.php?declared botweb
victorantonov.com2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)POST /cgi-bin/php?declared botweb
victorantonov.comtried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_includePOST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?declared botweb
victorantonov.comwas blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signatureGET /.git-credentialsdeclared botedge
victorantonov.com2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)GET /backend/.envdeclared botedge
victorantonov.comtried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_includePOST /index.php?declared botweb
victorantonov.com2× requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings (2 distinct paths)GET /docker-compose.ymldeclared botweb
victorantonov.com3× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (3 distinct paths)GET /credentials.jsondeclared botweb
victorantonov.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /secrets.envdeclared botweb
victorantonov.comrequested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistakeGET /.aws/credentialsdeclared botweb
victorantonov.com8× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (8 distinct paths)GET /.aws/configdeclared botweb
victorantonov.com5× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)GET /userfiles/x?declared botweb
victorantonov.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /api/system/fileView?declared botweb
victorantonov.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /userfiles?declared botweb
victorantonov.comtried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flawGET /api/system/fileView?declared botweb
victorantonov.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /api/fs/read?declared botweb
victorantonov.comtried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flawGET /api/fs/read?declared botweb
victorantonov.com2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)GET /gcp-credentials.jsondeclared botweb
victorantonov.com6× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (5 distinct paths)GET /api/w/default/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environdeclared botweb
victorantonov.com2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)GET /media../.envdeclared botedge
victorantonov.comwas blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signatureGET /%2eenvdeclared botedge
victorantonov.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /api/uploads/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f.envdeclared botweb
victorantonov.com3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)GET /dashboard%2F.envdeclared botweb

Network

ASN
AS396982 Google LLC
Network type
cloud
Reverse DNS
60.23.74.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country
United States US
Flags
cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact
found in the registry
Checked

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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