34.73.172.220

Blocked Brute Toolkit

Blocked since 10 Oct 2026 21:22 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 36/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 87all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 10 Oct 2026
Last seen: 10 Oct 2026 21:18
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 10 Oct 2026 21:18 UTC, most recently active on 10 Oct 2026 21:18 UTC.

Recorded 87 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (19 requests); it also requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (14); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (14).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against victorantonov.com.

Scored into the "Brute" level now; the highest it has reached is "Persistent". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 10 Oct 2026 21:00 UTC, with 87 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 10 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
10 Oct 2026	87

At least 87 requests a minute at its peak (10 Oct 2026 21:18 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 86, POST 1.
The servers we watch answered: 404 78, 403 3 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
10 Oct 2026
21:18	victorantonov.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /config/env/aws_credentials.env`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	probed for an exposed .svn directory to read the site's version-control metadata	`/.svn`	none	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /shared/.env`	declared bot	edge
21:18	victorantonov.com	requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings	`GET /.docker/config.json`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	probed for an exposed .svn directory to read the site's version-control metadata	`GET /.svn/entries`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	4× requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name (4 distinct paths)	`GET /id_ed25519`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	8× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (8 distinct paths)	`GET /google-credentials.json`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles?`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/system/fileView?`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw	`GET /api/system/fileView?`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	4× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /userfiles/x?`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/fs/read?`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw	`GET /api/fs/read?`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /apps/.env`	declared bot	edge
21:18	victorantonov.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /build../.env`	declared bot	edge
21:18	victorantonov.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/w/starter/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environ`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	probed a list of common site paths looking for an unprotected admin panel or staging copy	`GET /admin`	browser claim	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/w/admins/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environ`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	3× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner (3 distinct paths)	`GET /dashboard`	browser claim	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/w/default/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environ`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`GET /account`	browser claim	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	probed a Next.js/Auth.js (NextAuth) authentication route, consistent with fingerprinting a Next.js app's auth stack	`GET /auth`	browser claim	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	6× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner (6 distinct paths)	`GET /login`	browser claim	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	probed a Next.js/Auth.js (NextAuth) authentication route, consistent with fingerprinting a Next.js app's auth stack	`GET /auth/login`	browser claim	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /document.php?`	declared bot	web
21:18	victorantonov.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /%2Fapi/config`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 220.172.73.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: United States US
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 10 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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