34.73.161.140

In feed.txt Persistent Regular Toolkit

Blocked on our servers, including web requests through Cloudflare, since 10 Oct 2026 20:52 UTC, through 9 Jan 2027 20:53 UTC, and in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 45/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Brute
Attack-shaped requests: 375all time
Active days: 2UTC days
First seen: 10 Oct 2026
Last seen: 12 Oct 2026 07:06
Servers hit: 1
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 10 Oct 2026 20:48 UTC, most recently active on 12 Oct 2026 07:06 UTC.

Recorded 375 attack-shaped requests across 2 separate days.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (218 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (74); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (15).

Seen by our web sensor, against haived.com.

Scored into the "Persistent" level now; the highest it has reached is "Brute". Badges: Regular and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 12 Oct 2026 07:00 UTC, with 202 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 2 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 10 Oct 2026 to 9 Jan 2027.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
10 Oct 2026	173
12 Oct 2026	202

At least 202 requests a minute at its peak (12 Oct 2026 07:06 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 375, POST 2.
The servers we watch answered: 403 204, 301 173 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
12 Oct 2026
07:06	haived.com	4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)	`GET /config/env/aws_credentials.env`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw	`GET /@fs/proc/self/environ?`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings	`GET /.docker/config.json`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	probed for an exposed .svn directory to read the site's version-control metadata	`GET /.svn/entries`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /_nuxt/../.env`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/.env?`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /id_dsa`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.development?`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /id_ed25519`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.production?`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	2× requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.ssh/id_dsa`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env?`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /.gitconfig`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.www`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source	`GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL?`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env?`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source	`GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL?`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /env/.env`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	2× requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source	`GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL?`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /conf/.env`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/proc/self/cmdline?`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /private/.env`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt?`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /var/.env`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/../.env?`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /static/.env`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token?`	declared bot	web
07:06	haived.com	6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (6 distinct paths)	`GET /auth/.env`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 140.161.73.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: United States US
City: North Charleston (registry location of a hosting network)
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 10 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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