34.7.219.179

Blocked Brute Night Owl Toolkit

Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score
40/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level
Persistent
Attack-shaped requests
201all time
Active days
1UTC days
First seen
Last seen
Servers hit
2
Targets
1site
Times blocked
0by the evidence rules

First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.

Recorded 201 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (69 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (37); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (22).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against zmey.eu.

Scored into the "Brute" level now; the highest it has reached is "Persistent". Badges: Night Owl and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 201 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.

Daily counts
Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)Requests
201
  • At least 201 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
  • Methods: GET 175, POST 16.
  • The servers we watch answered: 404 171, 403 25 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
TimeSiteWhat happenedRequestUser agentSeen by
zmey.eu2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)POST /cgi-bin/php?declared botweb
zmey.eufuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that respondsPOST /index.php?declared botweb
zmey.eu2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)POST /cgi-bin/php?declared botweb
zmey.eutried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_includePOST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?declared botweb
zmey.eufuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that respondsPOST /index.php?declared botweb
zmey.euclaimed to be Googlebot while POSTing, something the real crawler never doesPOST /api/designer/v1/file-contentdeclared botweb
zmey.eu2× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner/apinoneweb
zmey.euclaimed to be Googlebot while POSTing, something the real crawler never doesPOST /api/functionRouterdeclared botweb
zmey.eu2× requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable/.gitnoneweb
zmey.eu3× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (3 distinct paths)POST /dashboarddeclared botedge
zmey.eurequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /configuration.jsdeclared botweb
zmey.euused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /static../.envdeclared botweb
zmey.eu2× requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings (2 distinct paths)GET /docker-compose.yamldeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /credentials.jsondeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /secrets.envdeclared botweb
zmey.euprobed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and configGET /.git/configdeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /secrets.jsondeclared botweb
zmey.euprobed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and configGET /.git/HEADdeclared botweb
zmey.eu3× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (3 distinct paths)GET /secrets.ymldeclared botweb
zmey.eu3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)GET /.next/.envdeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistakeGET /.aws/credentialsdeclared botweb
zmey.eu13× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (13 distinct paths)GET /docker/.envdeclared botweb
zmey.eutriggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attemptPOST /admindeclared botedge
zmey.eu4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)GET /.env.backupdeclared botweb

Network

ASN
AS396982 Google LLC
Network type
cloud
Reverse DNS
179.219.7.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country
The Netherlands NL
Flags
cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact
found in the registry
Checked

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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