34.47.62.131
Blocked Persistent Regular Toolkit
Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.
Record
- Score
- 62/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
- Worst level
- Persistent
- Attack-shaped requests
- 13,787all time
- Active days
- 3UTC days
- First seen
- Last seen
- Servers hit
- 2
- Targets
- 2sites
- Times blocked
- 1by the evidence rules
First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.
Recorded 13,787 attack-shaped requests across 3 separate days.
Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (7,414 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2,145); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (1,045).
Seen by our edge and web sensors, against 2 of the sites we watch: haived.com and vaibed.com.
Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badges: Regular and Toolkit.
Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 1,507 requests.
Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.
Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets, unclassified. Seen by: edge, web.
Activity, last 90 days
Active on 3 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.
Daily counts
| Day (UTC) | Requests |
|---|---|
| 2,240 | |
| 9,289 | |
| 2,258 |
- At least 503 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
- Methods: GET 13,806, POST 807.
- The servers we watch answered: 403 13,720, 404 249, 302 1 (totals only, from our web servers).
Evidence
Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.
| Time | Site | What happened | Request | User agent | Seen by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| vaibed.com | 6× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (6 distinct paths) | POST /api/auth | browser claim | edge | |
| haived.com | swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner | POST /api | browser claim | web | |
| haived.com | 6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths) | GET /@fs/.env? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner | POST /api | browser claim | web | |
| haived.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /api/.env | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake | GET /@fs/home/ubuntu/.aws/credentials? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /@fs/..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252fproc/self/environ? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /.env.old | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /@fs/..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252froot/.env? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths) | GET /.env.save | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake | GET /@fs/root/.aws/credentials? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths) | GET /.env.prod | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake | GET /@fs/home/ec2-user/.aws/credentials? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths) | GET /.env.backup | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings | GET /.changeset/config.json | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /.env.local | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings | GET /.turbo/config.json | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes | GET /.htpasswd | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths) | GET /.env.keys | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings | GET /docker-compose.yaml | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | made a request that matched no known pattern | GET /supabase/config.toml | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /@fs/../.env? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings | GET /docker-compose.yml | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /secrets.env | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config | GET /.git/HEAD | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 3× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (3 distinct paths) | GET /secrets.yml | declared bot | web | |
Network
- ASN
- AS396982 Google LLC
- Network type
- cloud
- Reverse DNS
131.62.47.34.bc.googleusercontent.com- Country
- Canada CA
- Flags
- cloud range (GCP)
- Abuse contact
- found in the registry
- Checked
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