34.39.235.51
Blocked Scanner Toolkit
Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.
Record
- Score
- 37/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
- Worst level
- Brute
- Attack-shaped requests
- 105all time
- Active days
- 1UTC days
- First seen
- Last seen
- Servers hit
- 1
- Targets
- 1site
- Times blocked
- 0by the evidence rules
First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.
Recorded 105 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.
Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (31 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (17); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (16).
Seen by our web sensor, against servbg.com.
Scored into the "Scanner" level now; the highest it has reached is "Brute". Badge: Toolkit.
Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 105 requests.
Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.
Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: web.
Activity, last 90 days
Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.
Daily counts
| Day (UTC) | Requests |
|---|---|
| 105 |
- At least 105 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
- Methods: GET 90, POST 8.
- The servers we watch answered: 403 57, 404 46, 200 2 (totals only, from our web servers).
Evidence
Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.
| Time | Site | What happened | Request | User agent | Seen by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| servbg.com | 2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths) | POST /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | POST /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths) | POST /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe? | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | POST /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /config.js | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings | GET /config.json | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated | GET /api/config | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /media../.env | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | /.env | none | web | |
| servbg.com | 3× requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake (3 distinct paths) | GET /@fs/home/ubuntu/.aws/credentials? | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 3× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (3 distinct paths) | GET /@fs/../.env? | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /@fs/src/.env? | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /.ssh/config | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name | GET /.ssh/id_ed25519 | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 2× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner (2 distinct paths) | GET /admin/login | browser claim | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name | GET /.ssh/id_rsa | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes | GET /.htpasswd | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 2× requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings (2 distinct paths) | GET /docker-compose.yaml | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 4× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner (4 distinct paths) | GET /account | browser claim | web | |
| servbg.com | probed a list of common site paths looking for an unprotected admin panel or staging copy | GET /admin | browser claim | web | |
| servbg.com | 3× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner (3 distinct paths) | GET /signup | browser claim | web | |
| servbg.com | probed a Next.js/Auth.js (NextAuth) authentication route, consistent with fingerprinting a Next.js app's auth stack | GET /auth | browser claim | web | |
| servbg.com | swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner | GET /login | browser claim | web | |
| servbg.com | probed a Next.js/Auth.js (NextAuth) authentication route, consistent with fingerprinting a Next.js app's auth stack | GET /auth/login | browser claim | web | |
| servbg.com | 2× requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable | /.git | none | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /credentials.json | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /secrets.env | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths) | GET /secrets.yml | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /.git-credentials | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /core/.env | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | 2× probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config (2 distinct paths) | GET /.git/HEAD | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /.aws/config | declared bot | web | |
Network
- ASN
- AS396982 Google LLC
- Network type
- cloud
- Reverse DNS
51.235.39.34.bc.googleusercontent.com- Country
- Brazil BR
- Flags
- cloud range (GCP)
- Abuse contact
- found in the registry
- Checked
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