34.34.159.106

Blocked Brute Night Owl Toolkit

Blocked since 11 Oct 2026 00:37 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 41/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Brute
Attack-shaped requests: 223all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 11 Oct 2026
Last seen: 11 Oct 2026 00:30
Servers hit: 1
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 11 Oct 2026 00:30 UTC, most recently active on 11 Oct 2026 00:30 UTC.

Recorded 223 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (123 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (37); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (15).

Seen by our web sensor, against servbg.com.

Scored into the "Brute" level, its highest so far. Badges: Night Owl and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 11 Oct 2026 00:00 UTC, with 223 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 11 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
11 Oct 2026	223

At least 223 requests a minute at its peak (11 Oct 2026 00:30 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 202, POST 1.
The servers we watch answered: 403 161, 404 64 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
11 Oct 2026
00:30	servbg.com	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yml`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings	`GET /.docker/config.json`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	2× requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.ssh/id_rsa`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes	`GET /.htpasswd`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.ssh/config`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable	`/.git`	none	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yaml`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /credentials.json`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/HEAD`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /secrets.json`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /secrets.env`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable	`/.git`	none	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`/config`	none	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.git-credentials`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /.aws/credentials`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.aws/config`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/config`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	23× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (23 distinct paths)	`GET /core/.env`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	2× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`/config`	none	web
00:30	servbg.com	3× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (3 distinct paths)	`GET /push_config.json`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /config/gcp-credentials.json`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env`	declared bot	web
00:30	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /firebase-credentials.json`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 106.159.34.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Belgium BE
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 11 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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