34.34.129.14

Blocked Persistent Regular Toolkit

Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score
70/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level
Persistent
Attack-shaped requests
46,125all time
Active days
2UTC days
First seen
Last seen
Servers hit
2
Targets
2sites
Times blocked
1by the evidence rules

First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.

Recorded 46,125 attack-shaped requests across 2 separate days.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (24,159 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (6,981); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (3,738).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against 2 of the sites we watch: haived.com and vaibed.com.

Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badges: Regular and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 3,098 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 2 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.

Daily counts
Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)Requests
24,687
21,438
  • At least 261 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
  • Methods: GET 46,187, POST 2,610.
  • The servers we watch answered: 403 46,563, 301 201 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
TimeSiteWhat happenedRequestUser agentSeen by
vaibed.com7× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (7 distinct paths)POST /api/routedeclared botedge
haived.com2× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scannerPOST /apideclared botweb
vaibed.com3× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (3 distinct paths)POST /_next/serverdeclared botedge
haived.com2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)GET /firebase-config.jsdeclared botweb
haived.com2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)GET /supabase/.envdeclared botweb
haived.commade a request that matched no known patternGET /samconfig.tomldeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /docker-compose/.envdeclared botweb
haived.com2× made a request that matched no known pattern (2 distinct paths)GET /terraform.tfstate.backupdeclared botweb
haived.comrequested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection stringsGET /docker-compose.dev.ymldeclared botweb
haived.commade a request that matched no known patternGET /config/environment.jsondeclared botweb
haived.comrequested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection stringsGET /docker-compose.prod.ymldeclared botweb
haived.com2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)GET /application/.envdeclared botweb
haived.comrequested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection stringsGET /docker-compose.override.ymldeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /.docker/secrets.jsondeclared botweb
haived.com2× requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings (2 distinct paths)GET /docker-compose.production.ymldeclared botweb
haived.com2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)GET /config/.env.stagingdeclared botweb
haived.commade a request that matched no known patternGET /config/database.jsondeclared botweb
haived.com10× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (10 distinct paths)GET /config/env/aws_credentials.envdeclared botweb
haived.comprobed for an exposed .svn directory to read the site's version-control metadataGET /.svn/entriesdeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settingsGET /.docker/config.jsondeclared botweb
haived.com2× requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name (2 distinct paths)GET /id_dsadeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /etc/.envdeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a private SSH key file by its conventional nameGET /id_rsadeclared botweb
haived.com2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)GET /env/.envdeclared botweb

Network

ASN
AS396982 Google LLC
Network type
cloud
Reverse DNS
14.129.34.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country
Belgium BE
Flags
cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact
found in the registry
Checked

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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