34.23.250.187

In feed.txt Persistent Regular Toolkit

Blocked on our servers, including web requests through Cloudflare, since 10 Oct 2026 17:17 UTC, through 8 Jan 2027 17:17 UTC, and in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 45/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 443all time
Active days: 2UTC days
First seen: 10 Oct 2026
Last seen: 11 Oct 2026 01:07
Servers hit: 1
Targets: 2sites
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 10 Oct 2026 17:12 UTC, most recently active on 11 Oct 2026 01:07 UTC.

Recorded 443 attack-shaped requests across 2 separate days.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (228 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (73); it also swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner (34).

Seen by our web sensor, against 2 of the sites we watch: 4emx.com and schetio.com.

Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badges: Regular and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 11 Oct 2026 01:00 UTC, with 234 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 2 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 10 Oct 2026 to 8 Jan 2027.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
10 Oct 2026	209
11 Oct 2026	234

At least 234 requests a minute at its peak (11 Oct 2026 01:07 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 405, POST 2.
The servers we watch answered: 403 248, 404 199 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
11 Oct 2026
01:07	schetio.com	2× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`/config`	none	web
01:07	schetio.com	3× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`/api`	none	web
01:07	schetio.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`/.env`	none	web
01:07	schetio.com	5× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`/api`	none	web
01:07	schetio.com	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`/document.php`	none	web
01:07	schetio.com	swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`/api`	none	web
01:07	schetio.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`/.env`	none	web
01:07	schetio.com	swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`/api`	none	web
01:07	schetio.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`/.env`	none	web
01:07	schetio.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /config/gcp-credentials.json`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles/x?`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	5× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (5 distinct paths)	`GET /google-credentials.json`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /workspace/.env`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /public/admin.json`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles/x?`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/system/fileView?`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw	`GET /api/system/fileView?`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api%2F.env`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw	`GET /api/fs/read?`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /cache/original/%2e%2e/.env`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /cache/original/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.env`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/fs/read?`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles?`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /dashboard%2F.env`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	4× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (4 distinct paths)	`GET /api/w/starter/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environ`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/uploads/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f.env`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /document.php?`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /static//app/.env`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /css../.env`	declared bot	web
01:07	schetio.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.//.env`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 187.250.23.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: United States US
City: North Charleston (registry location of a hosting network)
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 10 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.