34.19.207.126

Blocked Brute Toolkit

Blocked since 12 Oct 2026 12:17 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 46/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 259all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 12 Oct 2026
Last seen: 12 Oct 2026 12:10
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 12 Oct 2026 12:10 UTC, most recently active on 12 Oct 2026 12:10 UTC.

Recorded 259 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (131 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (39); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (19).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against zmey.eu.

Scored into the "Brute" level now; the highest it has reached is "Persistent". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 12 Oct 2026 12:00 UTC, with 259 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: honeypot, web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 12 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
12 Oct 2026	259

At least 259 requests a minute at its peak (12 Oct 2026 12:10 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 252, POST 14.
The servers we watch answered: 404 249, 403 8, 200 5 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
12 Oct 2026
12:10	zmey.eu	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	2× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`/api`	none	web
12:10	zmey.eu	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /firebase-config.js`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	probed for an exposed .svn directory to read the site's version-control metadata	`/.svn`	none	web
12:10	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env`	declared bot	edge
12:10	zmey.eu	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /prisma/.env`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /document.php?`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	2× made a request that matched no known pattern (2 distinct paths)	`GET /samconfig.toml`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /docker-compose/.env`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	5× requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings (5 distinct paths)	`GET /docker-compose.production.yml`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.docker/secrets.json`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /application/.env`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	3× made a request that matched no known pattern (3 distinct paths)	`GET /config/database.json`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	11× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (11 distinct paths)	`GET /config/.env.staging`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	probed for an exposed .svn directory to read the site's version-control metadata	`GET /.svn/entries`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings	`GET /.docker/config.json`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths)	`GET /.github/.env`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /id_ed25519`	declared bot	web
12:10	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /server/.env`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 126.207.19.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Canada CA
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 12 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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