34.187.181.50

Blocked Brute Night Owl Toolkit

Blocked since 11 Oct 2026 01:17 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 41/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Brute
Attack-shaped requests: 229all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 11 Oct 2026
Last seen: 11 Oct 2026 01:14
Servers hit: 1
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 11 Oct 2026 01:14 UTC, most recently active on 11 Oct 2026 01:14 UTC.

Recorded 229 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (128 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (37); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (15).

Seen by our web sensor, against servbg.com.

Scored into the "Brute" level, its highest so far. Badges: Night Owl and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 11 Oct 2026 01:00 UTC, with 229 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 11 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
11 Oct 2026	229

At least 229 requests a minute at its peak (11 Oct 2026 01:14 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 204, POST 1.
The servers we watch answered: 403 167, 404 64 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
11 Oct 2026
01:14	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /apps/.env`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`/.env`	none	web
01:14	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles?`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /firebase-credentials.json`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /cache/original/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.env`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /google-credentials.json`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /userfiles/x?`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/system/fileView?`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles?`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw	`GET /api/system/fileView?`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles/x?`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /cache/original/%2e%2e/.env`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/fs/read?`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /api/w/starter/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environ`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw	`GET /api/fs/read?`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	4× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (3 distinct paths)	`GET /document.php?`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`/api/.env`	none	web
01:14	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api%2F.env`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/uploads/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f.env`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /dashboard%2F.env`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/.env/public/.env`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /admin%2F.env`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /img../.env`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths)	`GET /.//.env`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	7× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (7 distinct paths)	`GET /css../.env`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles?`	declared bot	web
01:14	servbg.com	swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`GET /account`	browser claim	web
01:14	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /media../.env`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 50.181.187.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: United States US
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 11 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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