34.186.194.165

Blocked Scanner Toolkit

Blocked since 17 Oct 2026 16:55 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 44/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 199all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 4 Oct 2026
Last seen: 4 Oct 2026 17:09
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 1by the evidence rules

First seen on 4 Oct 2026 17:09 UTC, most recently active on 4 Oct 2026 17:09 UTC.

Recorded 199 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (82 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (31); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (19).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against servbg.com.

Scored into the "Scanner" level now; the highest it has reached is "Persistent". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 4 Oct 2026 17:00 UTC, with 199 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 17 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
4 Oct 2026	199

At least 199 requests a minute at its peak (4 Oct 2026 17:09 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 171, POST 7.
The servers we watch answered: 403 124, 404 69, 200 2 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
4 Oct 2026
17:09	servbg.com	probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open	`GET /actuator/gateway/routes`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`GET /api/v1/loginmethod?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`GET /api/v1/configs`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested wp-config.php or a backup copy of it, hoping to read the database password in clear text	`GET /wp-config.php~`	declared bot	edge
17:09	servbg.com	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested wp-config.php or a backup copy of it, hoping to read the database password in clear text	`GET /wp-config.old`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/console/api_server?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /wp/.env`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/console/api_server?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open	`GET /actuator`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /document.php?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /storage/.env`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw	`GET /api/system/fileView?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /cache/original/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.env`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`GET /info.php`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /cache/original/%2e%2e/.env`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested wp-config.php or a backup copy of it, hoping to read the database password in clear text	`GET /wp-config.php.swp`	declared bot	edge
17:09	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/fs/read?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw	`GET /api/fs/read?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /configuration.js`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested phpinfo.php, which dumps the full PHP configuration and environment if left in place	`GET /phpinfo.php`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open	`GET /actuator/loggers`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.swp`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /app-config.json`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.js`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open	`GET /actuator/mappings`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.dev`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /config.json.js`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /admin%2F.env`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open	`GET /actuator/configprops`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a database dump or site archive by its common backup filename	`GET /configuration.php.bak`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`GET /v1/onboarding/config?`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /app/.env`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a database dump or site archive by its common backup filename	`GET /config.php.bak`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.bak`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	2× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`/config`	none	web
17:09	servbg.com	2× requested wp-config.php or a backup copy of it, hoping to read the database password in clear text (2 distinct paths)	`GET /wp-config.php.bak`	declared bot	edge
17:09	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/uploads/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f.env`	declared bot	web
17:09	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.backup`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 165.194.186.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Canada CA
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 11 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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