34.185.252.155

Blocked Brute Toolkit

Blocked since 8 Oct 2026 20:22 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 40/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 176all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 8 Oct 2026
Last seen: 8 Oct 2026 20:16
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 8 Oct 2026 20:16 UTC, most recently active on 8 Oct 2026 20:16 UTC.

Recorded 176 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (62 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (35); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (22).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against obdebug.com.

Scored into the "Brute" level now; the highest it has reached is "Persistent". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 8 Oct 2026 20:00 UTC, with 176 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 8 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
8 Oct 2026	176

At least 176 requests a minute at its peak (8 Oct 2026 20:16 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 159, POST 15.
The servers we watch answered: 404 152, 403 19 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
8 Oct 2026
20:16	obdebug.com	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	claimed to be Googlebot while POSTing, something the real crawler never does	`POST /read-document`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	3× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (3 distinct paths)	`POST /admin`	declared bot	edge
20:16	obdebug.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /%2Fapi/config`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /api/data/..%2f..%2f.env`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_ed25519`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /_image?`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_rsa`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths)	`GET /dist/.env`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yaml`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /.aws/credentials`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes	`GET /.htpasswd`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)	`GET /frontend/.env`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env?`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /app/.env`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	2× requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source	`GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL?`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /src/.env`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.ssh/config`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/proc/self/cmdline?`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /backend/.env`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yml`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /build/.env`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt?`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/orders/..%2f..%2f.env`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.prod`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/.env`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token?`	declared bot	web
20:16	obdebug.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/../.env?`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 155.252.185.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Germany DE
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 15 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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