34.179.190.38

In feed.txt Relentless Regular Toolkit

Blocked on our servers, including web requests through Cloudflare, since 9 Oct 2026 00:47 UTC, through 8 Jan 2027 00:48 UTC, and in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 51/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Relentless
Attack-shaped requests: 2,048all time
Active days: 2UTC days
First seen: 9 Oct 2026
Last seen: 10 Oct 2026 00:22
Servers hit: 3
Targets: 3sites
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials; it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root; it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 2 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 9 Oct 2026 to 8 Jan 2027.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
9 Oct 2026	1,858
10 Oct 2026	190

At least 342 requests a minute at its peak (9 Oct 2026 00:41 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 1,886, POST 153.
The servers we watch answered: 403 1,776, 301 136, 404 85, 200 2 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
10 Oct 2026
00:22	haived.com	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	claimed to be Googlebot while POSTing, something the real crawler never does	`POST /api/designer/v1/file-content`	declared bot	web
00:22	servbg.dev	triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt	`POST /api/auth`	declared bot	edge
00:22	haived.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /configuration.js`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	5× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (5 distinct paths)	`GET /public../.env`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yaml`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /files../.env`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yml`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /media../.env`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)	`GET /dist/.env`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /credentials.json`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /frontend/.env`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /secrets.json`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /web/.env`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.git-credentials`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /public/.env`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	2× probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.git/config`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /.aws/credentials`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.aws/config`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /core/.env`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /api/w/admins/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environ`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /config/.env`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/console/api_server?`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /backend/.env`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /config/gcp-credentials.json`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.prod`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /public/admin.json`	declared bot	web
00:22	haived.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/.env`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 38.190.179.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Germany DE
City: Frankfurt am Main (registry location of a hosting network)
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 9 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.