34.158.231.148
Blocked Persistent Regular Toolkit
Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.
Record
- Score
- 50/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
- Worst level
- Persistent
- Attack-shaped requests
- 581all time
- Active days
- 2UTC days
- First seen
- Last seen
- Servers hit
- 2
- Targets
- 1site
- Times blocked
- 1by the evidence rules
First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.
Recorded 581 attack-shaped requests across 2 separate days.
Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (293 requests); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (66); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (45).
Seen by our edge and web sensors, against 47ho.com.
Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badges: Regular and Toolkit.
Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 304 requests.
Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.
Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets, unclassified. Seen by: edge, web.
Activity, last 90 days
Active on 2 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.
Daily counts
| Day (UTC) | Requests |
|---|---|
| 304 | |
| 277 |
- At least 304 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
- Methods: GET 511, POST 46.
- The servers we watch answered: 403 387, 404 114, 301 82 (totals only, from our web servers).
Evidence
Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.
| Time | Site | What happened | Request | User agent | Seen by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 47ho.com | fuzzed a common filename under /cgi-bin/, looking for a forgotten legacy CGI script | /cgi-bin | none | web | |
| 47ho.com | 2× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (2 distinct paths) | POST /settings | browser claim | edge | |
| 47ho.com | tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code | GET /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code | POST /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | fuzzed a common filename under /cgi-bin/, looking for a forgotten legacy CGI script | /cgi-bin | none | web | |
| 47ho.com | tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code | GET /cgi-bin/php-cgi? | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | /index.php | none | web | |
| 47ho.com | triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt | POST /admin | browser claim | edge | |
| 47ho.com | tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code | POST /cgi-bin/php-cgi? | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | GET /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | fuzzed a common filename under /cgi-bin/, looking for a forgotten legacy CGI script | /cgi-bin | none | web | |
| 47ho.com | 3× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (3 distinct paths) | POST /actions | browser claim | edge | |
| 47ho.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | POST /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code | GET /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt | POST /__flight | browser claim | edge | |
| 47ho.com | tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code | POST /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | fuzzed a common filename under /cgi-bin/, looking for a forgotten legacy CGI script | /cgi-bin | none | web | |
| 47ho.com | 4× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (4 distinct paths) | POST /app | browser claim | edge | |
| 47ho.com | tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code | GET /cgi-bin/php-cgi.exe? | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code | POST /cgi-bin/php-cgi.exe? | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | /firebase-credentials.json | none | web | |
| 47ho.com | swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner | /api | none | web | |
| 47ho.com | 2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths) | /gcp-credentials.json | none | web | |
| 47ho.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /firebase-credentials.json | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | 2× tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw (2 distinct paths) | GET /api/proc/self/environ | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | 3× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (3 distinct paths) | GET /gcp-credentials.json | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | made a request that matched no known pattern | /samconfig.toml | none | web | |
| 47ho.com | made a request that matched no known pattern | GET /proc/self/environ%3F.js | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable | GET /.git/config%3F.css | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | made a request that matched no known pattern | GET /samconfig.toml | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /supabase/.env | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | 2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths) | /firebaseConfig.js | none | web | |
| 47ho.com | made a request that matched no known pattern | /terraform.tfstate.backup | none | web | |
| 47ho.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | /.env.supabase | none | web | |
| 47ho.com | made a request that matched no known pattern | /docker-compose | none | web | |
| 47ho.com | made a request that matched no known pattern | GET /.aws/credentials%3F.txt | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /api/uploads/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f.env | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /settings%2F.env | declared bot | web | |
| 47ho.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /firebaseConfig.js | declared bot | web | |
Network
- ASN
- AS396982 Google LLC
- Network type
- cloud
- Reverse DNS
148.231.158.34.bc.googleusercontent.com- Country
- Poland PL
- Flags
- cloud range (GCP)
- Abuse contact
- found in the registry
- Checked
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