34.156.103.50

Blocked Persistent Toolkit

Blocked since 17 Oct 2026 14:32 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 47/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 267all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 17 Oct 2026
Last seen: 17 Oct 2026 14:27
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 17 Oct 2026 14:27 UTC, most recently active on 17 Oct 2026 14:27 UTC.

Recorded 267 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (141 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (39); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (17).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against servbg.com.

Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 17 Oct 2026 14:00 UTC, with 267 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: honeypot, web-app. Attack types: injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 17 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
17 Oct 2026	267

At least 267 requests a minute at its peak (17 Oct 2026 14:27 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 258, POST 1.
The servers we watch answered: 403 187, 404 83, 200 6 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
17 Oct 2026
14:27	servbg.com	7× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`/.env.local`	none	web
14:27	servbg.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env`	declared bot	edge
14:27	servbg.com	7× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.local?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	2× requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source	`GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/proc/self/cwd/.env?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/../.env?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source	`GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/var/task/.env?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source	`GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/proc/self/cmdline?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/.env?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	2× requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake (2 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/home/ubuntu/.aws/credentials?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for	`GET /.env?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for	`GET /@fs/../.env?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable	`/.git`	none	web
14:27	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/src/.env?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252fproc/self/environ?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /@fs/root/.aws/credentials?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/app/.env.production?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /supabase/config.toml`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/../.env?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/app/.env?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252froot/.env?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/app/.env?`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /.cargo/credentials.toml`	declared bot	web
14:27	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.ssh/config`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 50.103.156.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Belgium BE
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 17 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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