34.151.199.172

Blocked Brute Toolkit

Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score
45/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level
Brute
Attack-shaped requests
233all time
Active days
1UTC days
First seen
Last seen
Servers hit
2
Targets
1site
Times blocked
0by the evidence rules

First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.

Recorded 233 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (114 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (39); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (12).

Seen by our web sensor, against servbg.com.

Scored into the "Brute" level, its highest so far. Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 233 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: honeypot, web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.

Daily counts
Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)Requests
233
  • At least 233 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
  • Methods: GET 216, POST 8.
  • The servers we watch answered: 403 152, 404 82, 200 8 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
TimeSiteWhat happenedRequestUser agentSeen by
servbg.com2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)POST /cgi-bin/php?declared botweb
servbg.comtried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_includePOST /index.php?declared botweb
servbg.com2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)POST /cgi-bin/php?declared botweb
servbg.com2× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated/confignoneweb
servbg.comtried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_includePOST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?declared botweb
servbg.com2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)GET /public/admin.jsondeclared botweb
servbg.com4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)GET /.env.exampledeclared botweb
servbg.com2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)GET /config/gcp-credentials.jsondeclared botweb
servbg.comrequested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask forGET /.envdeclared botweb
servbg.com3× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (3 distinct paths)GET /firebase-admin.jsondeclared botweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /userfiles?declared botweb
servbg.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /firebase-credentials.jsondeclared botweb
servbg.com6× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (4 distinct paths)GET /userfiles?declared botweb
servbg.com2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)GET /api/system/fileView?declared botweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /api/w/starter/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environdeclared botweb
servbg.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/tokendeclared botweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /userfiles?declared botweb
servbg.com2× tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw (2 distinct paths)GET /api/fs/read?declared botweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /cache/original/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.envdeclared botweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /cache/original/%2e%2e/.envdeclared botweb
servbg.comrequested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask forGET /cache/original/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.envdeclared botweb
servbg.com4× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (3 distinct paths)GET /api/console/api_server?declared botweb
servbg.com4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)GET /settings%2F.envdeclared botweb
servbg.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /app/..;/.envdeclared botweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /....//....//....//..../proc/self/environdeclared botweb
servbg.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /api/..;/.envdeclared botweb
servbg.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /.//.envdeclared botweb

Network

ASN
AS396982 Google LLC
Network type
cloud
Reverse DNS
172.199.151.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country
Brazil BR
Flags
cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact
found in the registry
Checked

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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Every listing carries its evidence on its page, and blocks are lifted only by us; if you were blocked and have fixed the cause, write to abuse-reports@abuse.servbg.com.