34.147.5.173

Blocked Persistent Regular Night Owl Toolkit

Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score
49/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level
Persistent
Attack-shaped requests
735all time
Active days
2UTC days
First seen
Last seen
Servers hit
2
Targets
1site
Times blocked
1by the evidence rules

First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.

Recorded 735 attack-shaped requests across 2 separate days.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (405 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (117); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (42).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against haived.com.

Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badges: Regular, Night Owl and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 259 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets, unclassified. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 2 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.

Daily counts
Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)Requests
218
517
  • At least 259 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
  • Methods: GET 723, POST 42.
  • The servers we watch answered: 403 523, 301 208 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
TimeSiteWhat happenedRequestUser agentSeen by
haived.com9× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (9 distinct paths)POST /api/authdeclared botedge
haived.com2× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scannerPOST /apideclared botweb
haived.comtriggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attemptPOST /apideclared botedge
haived.com6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (6 distinct paths)GET /public/.envdeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /push_config.jsondeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /config/.envdeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /firebase-credentials.jsondeclared botweb
haived.com4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)GET /admin/.envdeclared botweb
haived.com2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)GET /config/firebase-admin.jsondeclared botweb
haived.com5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths)GET /.env.backupdeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /firebase-admin.jsondeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /.env.productiondeclared botweb
haived.com2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)GET /public/admin.jsondeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /services/.envdeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /gcp-credentials.jsondeclared botweb
haived.com2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)GET /userfiles/x?declared botweb
haived.comprobed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and configGET /.git/HEADdeclared botweb
haived.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /userfiles?declared botweb
haived.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /secrets.envdeclared botweb
haived.com2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)GET /.git-credentialsdeclared botweb
haived.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /userfiles?declared botweb
haived.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /secrets.ymldeclared botweb
haived.comprobed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and configGET /.git/configdeclared botweb
haived.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /userfiles?declared botweb
haived.comrequested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistakeGET /.aws/credentialsdeclared botweb

Network

ASN
AS396982 Google LLC
Network type
cloud
Reverse DNS
173.5.147.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country
The Netherlands NL
Flags
cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact
found in the registry
Checked

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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