34.142.232.143

Blocked Scanner Toolkit

Blocked since 17 Oct 2026 16:55 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 41/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Brute
Attack-shaped requests: 96all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 6 Oct 2026
Last seen: 6 Oct 2026 17:33
Servers hit: 1
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 1by the evidence rules

First seen on 6 Oct 2026 17:33 UTC, most recently active on 6 Oct 2026 17:33 UTC.

Recorded 96 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (35 requests); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (15); it also swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner (10).

Seen by our web sensor, against servbg.com.

Scored into the "Scanner" level now; the highest it has reached is "Brute". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 6 Oct 2026 17:00 UTC, with 96 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 17 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
6 Oct 2026	96

At least 96 requests a minute at its peak (6 Oct 2026 17:33 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 82, POST 8.
The servers we watch answered: 403 60, 404 34, 200 2 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
6 Oct 2026
17:33	servbg.com	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /config.js`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`GET /api/config`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings	`GET /config.json`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/src/.env?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`/.env`	none	web
17:33	servbg.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/app/.env?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252froot/.env?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	2× requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake (2 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/root/.aws/credentials?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/../.env?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /@fs/home/ubuntu/.aws/credentials?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252fproc/self/environ?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/src/.env?`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes	`GET /.htpasswd`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.ssh/config`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	2× requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.ssh/id_rsa`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	2× requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings (2 distinct paths)	`GET /docker-compose.yaml`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	7× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner (7 distinct paths)	`GET /account`	browser claim	web
17:33	servbg.com	probed a list of common site paths looking for an unprotected admin panel or staging copy	`GET /admin`	browser claim	web
17:33	servbg.com	swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`GET /users/login`	browser claim	web
17:33	servbg.com	requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable	`/.git`	none	web
17:33	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.git-credentials`	declared bot	web
17:33	servbg.com	swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`GET /signin`	browser claim	web
17:33	servbg.com	2× probed a Next.js/Auth.js (NextAuth) authentication route, consistent with fingerprinting a Next.js app's auth stack (2 distinct paths)	`GET /auth`	browser claim	web
17:33	servbg.com	swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`GET /login`	browser claim	web
17:33	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /credentials.json`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 143.232.142.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Singapore SG
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 13 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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