34.14.87.56

Blocked Script Kiddie Toolkit

Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score
44/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level
Scanner
Attack-shaped requests
262all time
Active days
1UTC days
First seen
Last seen
Servers hit
2
Targets
2sites
Times blocked
1by the evidence rules

First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.

Recorded 262 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (134 requests); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (33); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (31); 1 request matched no known pattern.

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against 2 of the sites we watch: haiv.dev and haived.com.

Scored into the "Script Kiddie" level now; the highest it has reached is "Scanner". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 262 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.

Daily counts
Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)Requests
262
  • At least 262 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
  • Methods: GET 273, POST 1.
  • The servers we watch answered: 404 269, 302 1 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
TimeSiteWhat happenedRequestUser agentSeen by
haived.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /aws-config.jsdeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /@fs/app/.env.local?declared botweb
haived.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /userfiles?declared botweb
haived.comfuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that respondsGET /i.phpdeclared botweb
haived.com4× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (4 distinct paths)GET /dist../.envdeclared botweb
haiv.devtriggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attemptPOST /apideclared botedge
haived.com2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)GET /.env.local?declared botweb
haived.com2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)GET /@fs/../.env?declared botweb
haived.com5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths)GET /.env?declared botweb
haived.comfuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that respondsGET /test.phpdeclared botweb
haived.com3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)GET /.env.production?declared botweb
haived.comfuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that respondsGET /pi.phpdeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /.env.production?declared botweb
haived.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/tokendeclared botweb
haived.comfuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that respondsGET /info.phpdeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /.env.local?declared botweb
haived.comrequested phpinfo.php, which dumps the full PHP configuration and environment if left in placeGET /phpinfo.phpdeclared botweb
haived.com2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /.env?declared botweb
haived.comprobed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left openGET /actuator/mappingsdeclared botweb
haived.comtried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flawGET /index.php?declared botweb
haived.comprobed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left openGET /actuator/configpropsdeclared botweb
haived.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /api/console/api_server?declared botweb
haived.comprobed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left openGET /actuatordeclared botweb
haived.com2× fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that respondsGET /index.php?declared botweb
haived.comrequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /awsConfig.jsdeclared botweb
haived.com2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)GET /api/console/api_server?declared botweb
haived.commade a request that matched no known patternGET /awsconfiguration.jsondeclared botweb
haived.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /api/w/starter/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environdeclared botweb
haived.commade a request that matched no known patternGET /api/sysConfig/getAlldeclared botweb
haived.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /api/w/default/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environdeclared botweb
haived.commade a request that matched no known patternGET /src/amplifyconfiguration.jsondeclared botweb
haived.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /api/w/admins/jobs_u/get_log_file/../../../../proc/self/environdeclared botweb
haived.comrequested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticatedGET /v1/onboarding/config?declared botweb
haived.commade a request that matched no known patternGET /amplifyconfiguration.jsondeclared botweb
haived.com2× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated (2 distinct paths)GET /api/configdeclared botweb

Network

ASN
AS396982 Google LLC
Network type
cloud
Reverse DNS
56.87.14.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country
Belgium BE
Flags
cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact
found in the registry
Checked

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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