34.138.2.199

Blocked Scanner Toolkit

Blocked since 17 Oct 2026 16:55 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 43/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Brute
Attack-shaped requests: 183all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 1 Oct 2026
Last seen: 1 Oct 2026 14:50
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 1by the evidence rules

First seen on 1 Oct 2026 14:50 UTC, most recently active on 1 Oct 2026 14:50 UTC.

Recorded 183 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (77 requests); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (21); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (16).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against servbg.com.

Scored into the "Scanner" level now; the highest it has reached is "Brute". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 1 Oct 2026 14:00 UTC, with 183 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 17 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
1 Oct 2026	183

At least 183 requests a minute at its peak (1 Oct 2026 14:50 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 172.
The servers we watch answered: 403 107, 404 72, 200 2 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
1 Oct 2026
14:50	servbg.com	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`GET /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open	`GET /actuator/gateway/routes`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`GET /index.php?`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`GET /api/v1/loginmethod?`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code	`GET /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yaml`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code	`GET /cgi-bin/php-cgi.exe?`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`GET /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /assets../.env`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`GET /index.php?`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	3× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (3 distinct paths)	`GET /files../.env`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`GET /test.php`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_rsa`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes	`GET /.htpasswd`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yml`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	2× requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable	`/.git`	none	web
14:50	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /credentials.json`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /secrets.env`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /secrets.yml`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.git-credentials`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /secrets.json`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /src/.env`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	2× probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.git/HEAD`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /build/.env`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.aws/config`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /.aws/credentials`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	16× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (16 distinct paths)	`GET /core/.env`	declared bot	web
14:50	servbg.com	2× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`/config`	none	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 199.2.138.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: United States US
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 11 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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