34.133.107.96

Blocked Scanner Toolkit

Blocked since 17 Oct 2026 16:55 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 44/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 193all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 5 Oct 2026
Last seen: 5 Oct 2026 06:04
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 1by the evidence rules

First seen on 5 Oct 2026 06:04 UTC, most recently active on 5 Oct 2026 06:04 UTC.

Recorded 193 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (66 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (36); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (22).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against zmey.eu.

Scored into the "Scanner" level now; the highest it has reached is "Persistent". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 5 Oct 2026 06:00 UTC, with 193 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 17 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
5 Oct 2026	193

At least 193 requests a minute at its peak (5 Oct 2026 06:04 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 174, POST 12.
The servers we watch answered: 404 168, 403 22 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
5 Oct 2026
06:04	zmey.eu	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)	`POST /cgi-bin/php?`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include	`POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`POST /index.php?`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	2× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`/api`	none	web
06:04	zmey.eu	probed for an exposed GraphQL endpoint or its config file, often a precursor to an introspection query	`GET /graphql/console`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/orders/..%2fadmin/config.json`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	4× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated (4 distinct paths)	`GET /api/v1/config/`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	probed for an exposed GraphQL endpoint or its config file, often a precursor to an introspection query	`GET /graphql`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	3× fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds (3 distinct paths)	`GET /i.php`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open	`GET /actuator/loggers`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`/.env`	none	web
06:04	zmey.eu	fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds	`GET /info.php`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested phpinfo.php, which dumps the full PHP configuration and environment if left in place	`GET /phpinfo.php`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open	`GET /actuator/mappings`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.js`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	2× probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open (2 distinct paths)	`GET /actuator/configprops`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/data/..%2f..%2f.env`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/src/.env?`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_ed25519`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.ssh/config`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/app/.env.local?`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/../.env?`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /config.json.js`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes	`GET /.htpasswd`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /credentials.js`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/app/.env?`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yaml`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/.env?`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.yml`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/.env?`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_rsa`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/orders/..%2f..%2fproc/self/environ`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /%2Fapi/config`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)	`GET /api/orders/..%2f..%2f.env`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /_nuxt/../.env`	declared bot	web
06:04	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/var/task/.env?`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 96.107.133.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: United States US
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 12 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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