34.104.183.118

Blocked Brute Night Owl Toolkit

Blocked since 17 Oct 2026 04:47 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 46/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Brute
Attack-shaped requests: 266all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 17 Oct 2026
Last seen: 17 Oct 2026 04:42
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 17 Oct 2026 04:42 UTC, most recently active on 17 Oct 2026 04:42 UTC.

Recorded 266 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (135 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (39); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (19).

Seen by our web sensor, against servbg.com.

Scored into the "Brute" level, its highest so far. Badges: Night Owl and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 17 Oct 2026 04:00 UTC, with 266 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: honeypot, web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 17 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
17 Oct 2026	266

At least 266 requests a minute at its peak (17 Oct 2026 04:42 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 257, POST 1.
The servers we watch answered: 403 187, 404 84, 200 7 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
17 Oct 2026
04:42	servbg.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`/.env.production`	none	web
04:42	servbg.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.production?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source	`GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/app/.env.production?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/../.env?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source	`GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/src/.env?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source	`GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/proc/self/cmdline?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/app/.env.local?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	used Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project root	`GET /@fs/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled source	`GET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/.env?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/../.env?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/app/.env?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	2× requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake (2 distinct paths)	`GET /@fs/root/.aws/credentials?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252fproc/self/environ?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /@fs/home/ubuntu/.aws/credentials?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /@fs/..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252froot/.env?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for	`GET /.env?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for	`GET /@fs/../.env?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /@fs/src/.env?`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /.cargo/credentials.toml`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	claimed to be Bingbot while requesting an admin or credentials path the real crawler never touches	`GET /.env.prod.local`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.config`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /.dbeaver/credentials-config.json`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_ed25519`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /.config/gcloud/credentials.db`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.secret`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	2× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`/config`	none	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.credentials`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_rsa`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.ssh/config`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /supabase/config.toml`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /push_config.json`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes	`GET /.htpasswd`	declared bot	web
04:42	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /config/firebase-admin.json`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 118.183.104.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Japan JP
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 17 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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