34.104.164.220
In feed.txt Persistent Regular Toolkit
Blocked on our servers, including web requests through Cloudflare, since UTC, through UTC, and in feed.txt.
Record
- Score
- 43/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
- Worst level
- Persistent
- Attack-shaped requests
- 278all time
- Active days
- 2UTC days
- First seen
- Last seen
- Servers hit
- 2
- Targets
- 2sites
- Times blocked
- 0by the evidence rules
First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.
Recorded 278 attack-shaped requests across 2 separate days.
Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (145 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (41); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (19); 11 requests matched no known pattern.
Seen by our edge and web sensors, against 2 of the sites we watch: haived.com and servbg.dev.
Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badges: Regular and Toolkit.
Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 253 requests.
Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.
Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets, unclassified. Seen by: edge, web.
Activity, last 90 days
Active on 2 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: to .
Daily counts
| Day (UTC) | Requests |
|---|---|
| 263 | |
| 15 |
- At least 253 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
- Methods: GET 269, POST 22.
- The servers we watch answered: 404 249, 403 10, 302 1 (totals only, from our web servers).
Evidence
Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.
| Time | Site | What happened | Request | User agent | Seen by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| servbg.dev | 3× was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature (3 distinct paths) | POST /webhook-test/ | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code | POST /cgi-bin/php-cgi | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature | GET /google-credentials.json | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /api/.env | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature | GET /.env.development::$DATA | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | 2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths) | GET /scripts/.env | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /@fs/../.env | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /project/.env | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root | GET /api/orders/..%2fadmin/config.json | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | 2× was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature (2 distinct paths) | GET /api-docs | browser claim | edge | |
| servbg.dev | requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings | GET /docker-compose.staging.yml | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature | POST /api/auth | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | 3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths) | GET /@fs/app/.env.production | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature | GET /.cargo/credentials.toml | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /config/env/aws_credentials.env | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config | GET /.git/HEAD | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature | GET /.bashrc | declared bot | edge | |
| servbg.dev | was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature | POST /admin | declared bot | edge | |
| haived.com | claimed to be Googlebot while POSTing, something the real crawler never does | POST /form/ | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths) | POST /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | POST /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths) | POST /cgi-bin/php? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | tried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_include | POST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | POST /index.php? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | claimed to be Googlebot while POSTing, something the real crawler never does | POST /langflow/api/v1/validate/code | declared bot | web | |
| servbg.dev | 4× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (4 distinct paths) | POST /api/auth | declared bot | edge | |
| haived.com | 4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths) | GET /.env.production? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings | GET /docker-compose.dev.yml | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /.docker/secrets.json | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | 5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths) | GET /.env.local? | declared bot | web | |
| haived.com | requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /firebaseConfig.js | declared bot | web | |
Network
- ASN
- AS396982 Google LLC
- Network type
- cloud
- Reverse DNS
220.164.104.34.bc.googleusercontent.com- Country
- Japan JP
- City
- Tokyo (registry location of a hosting network)
- Flags
- cloud range (GCP)
- Abuse contact
- found in the registry
- Checked
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