2a0f:ca80:b00b:8ae4::5

Blocked Brute Toolkit

Blocked since 17 Oct 2026 16:56 UTC, no end date. Its /64 prefix is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 37/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 41all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 11 Oct 2026
Last seen: 11 Oct 2026 20:47
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 1by the evidence rules

First seen on 11 Oct 2026 20:47 UTC, most recently active on 11 Oct 2026 20:47 UTC.

Recorded 41 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (22 requests); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (5); it also fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds (3); 1 request matched no known pattern.

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against bursukov.com.

Scored into the "Brute" level now; the highest it has reached is "Persistent". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 11 Oct 2026 20:00 UTC, with 41 requests.

Routed via AS197170 (TechTies Inc.), a hosting network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: scanning, hunting for secrets, unclassified. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 17 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
11 Oct 2026	41

At least 41 requests a minute at its peak (11 Oct 2026 20:47 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 46.
The servers we watch answered: 403 27, 404 17 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
11 Oct 2026
20:47	bursukov.com	4× made a request that matched no known pattern (4 distinct paths)	`GET /admin/debug/default/view?`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /aws.yml`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	was blocked at the edge without matching any specific attack signature	`GET /wp-config.php-backup`	browser claim	edge
20:47	bursukov.com	requested wp-config.php or a backup copy of it, hoping to read the database password in clear text	`GET /wp-config.php.bak`	browser claim	edge
20:47	bursukov.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /aws/credentials.json`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/config`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	3× requested a database dump or site archive by its common backup filename (3 distinct paths)	`GET /db1.sql`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /.aws/credentials`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.bak`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /config.js`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.AWS_/credentials`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner	`GET /register/`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	10× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (10 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.example`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /config/env.prod.json`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (6 distinct paths)	`GET /laravel/config/.env`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/shared/config/config.env`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)	`GET /v2/.env`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	3× fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds (3 distinct paths)	`GET /debug.php`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	2× requested phpinfo.php, which dumps the full PHP configuration and environment if left in place (2 distinct paths)	`GET /phpinfo.php`	browser claim	web
20:47	bursukov.com	probed the WordPress GravitySMTP plugin's REST test mock-data route, a known information-disclosure endpoint	`GET /wp-json/gravitysmtp/v1/tests/mock-data?`	browser claim	web

Network

ASN: AS197170 TechTies Inc.
Network type: hosting
Reverse DNS: none
Country: Germany DE
Flags: none observed
Abuse contact: not found
Checked: 17 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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