194.180.49.41
Blocked Wanted Regular Toolkit
Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.
Record
- Score
- 58/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
- Worst level
- Wanted
- Attack-shaped requests
- 903all time
- Active days
- 13UTC days
- First seen
- Last seen
- Servers hit
- 11
- Targets
- 15sites
- Times blocked
- 1by the evidence rules
First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.
Recorded 903 attack-shaped requests across 13 separate days.
Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (384 requests); it also requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (379); it also requested wp-config.php or a backup copy of it, hoping to read the database password in clear text (62).
Seen by our edge, honeypot and web sensors, against 15 of the sites we watch, among them 4emx.com, amosix.eu, bgpoet.com, carrentvarna.com and dubstard.com.
Scored into the "Wanted" level, its highest so far. Badges: Regular and Toolkit.
Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 513 requests.
Routed via AS201814 (MEVSPACE sp. z o.o.), a home broadband network.
Surfaces: honeypot, web-app. Attack types: leaked-password reuse, known exploits, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, honeypot, web.
Activity, last 90 days
Active on 13 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.
Daily counts
| Day (UTC) | Requests |
|---|---|
| 13 | |
| 35 | |
| 13 | |
| 69 | |
| 15 | |
| 23 | |
| 86 | |
| 78 | |
| 3 | |
| 1 | |
| 20 | |
| 530 | |
| 17 |
- At least 389 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
- Methods: GET 1,026, HEAD 1, POST 1.
- The servers we watch answered: 429 465, 404 282, 200 68, 403 26 (totals only, from our web servers).
Evidence
Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.
| Time | Site | What happened | Request | User agent | Seen by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /application.properties | honeypot | |||
| requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for | GET /database.yml | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings (2 distinct paths) | GET /docker-compose.yaml | honeypot | |||
| requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake | GET /.aws/credentials | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (2 distinct paths) | GET /appsettings.Production.json | honeypot | |||
| requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings | GET /config.json | honeypot | |||
| requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes | GET /.htpasswd | honeypot | |||
| fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | GET /config.php | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested wp-config.php or a backup copy of it, hoping to read the database password in clear text (2 distinct paths) | GET /wp-config.php.bak | honeypot | |||
| 3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths) | GET /.env.local | honeypot | |||
| requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /.env | honeypot | |||
| requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for | GET / | honeypot | |||
| requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot | GET /application.properties | honeypot | |||
| requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for | GET /database.yml | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings (2 distinct paths) | GET /docker-compose.yaml | honeypot | |||
| requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake | GET /.aws/credentials | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (2 distinct paths) | GET /appsettings.Production.json | honeypot | |||
| requested a config.json file, hoping it exposes API keys or internal settings | GET /config.json | honeypot | |||
| requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes | GET /.htpasswd | honeypot | |||
| fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds | GET /config.php | honeypot | |||
| 2× requested wp-config.php or a backup copy of it, hoping to read the database password in clear text (2 distinct paths) | GET /wp-config.php.bak | honeypot | |||
| 3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths) | GET /.env.local | honeypot | |||
| requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials | GET /.env | honeypot | |||
| requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for | GET / | honeypot | |||
| 16× requested a decoy path that only a scanner would ask for (16 distinct paths) | GET /database.yml | honeypot | |||
Network
- ASN
- AS201814 MEVSPACE sp. z o.o.
- Network type
- home broadband
- Reverse DNS
- none
- Country
- Bulgaria BG
- Flags
- none observed
- Abuse contact
- found in the registry
- Checked
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