136.110.34.33

Blocked Scanner Night Owl Toolkit

Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score
39/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level
Brute
Attack-shaped requests
148all time
Active days
1UTC days
First seen
Last seen
Servers hit
1
Targets
1site
Times blocked
0by the evidence rules

First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.

Recorded 148 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (65 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (21); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (15).

Seen by our web sensor, against servbg.com.

Scored into the "Scanner" level now; the highest it has reached is "Brute". Badges: Night Owl and Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 148 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.

Daily counts
Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)Requests
148
  • At least 148 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
  • Methods: GET 121, POST 8.
  • The servers we watch answered: 403 94, 404 52, 200 2 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
TimeSiteWhat happenedRequestUser agentSeen by
servbg.com2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)POST /cgi-bin/php?declared botweb
servbg.comtried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_includePOST /index.php?declared botweb
servbg.comtried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute codePOST /cgi-bin/php?declared botweb
servbg.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials/.envnoneweb
servbg.comtried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute codePOST /cgi-bin/php-cgi.exe?declared botweb
servbg.comtried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_includePOST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?declared botweb
servbg.com2× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (2 distinct paths)GET /media../.envdeclared botweb
servbg.comprobed a WordPress admin/content path used to fingerprint the installation or hunt for an exposed upload/plugin surfaceGET /wp-jsondeclared botweb
servbg.com3× used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (3 distinct paths)GET /static../.envdeclared botweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /api/orders/..%2f..%2f.envdeclared botweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /_nuxt/../.envdeclared botweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /api/orders/..%2f..%2fproc/self/environdeclared botweb
servbg.com4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)/.env.localnoneweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /api/orders/..%2fadmin/config.jsondeclared botweb
servbg.com6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths)GET /.env.local?declared botweb
servbg.com8× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)/.envnoneweb
servbg.com6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)GET /.env?declared botweb
servbg.comrequested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled sourceGET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL?declared botweb
servbg.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /.env?declared botweb
servbg.com3× requested a Vite/React-Server-Components source map, likely while mapping the app's bundled sourceGET /__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL?declared botweb
servbg.comused Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project rootGET /@fs/proc/self/cmdline?declared botweb
servbg.comrequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /@fs/app/.env.production?declared botweb
servbg.comused Vite dev server's @fs/ path to try to read arbitrary files outside the project rootGET /@fs/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token?declared botweb
servbg.comused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /@fs/../.env?declared botweb

Network

ASN
AS396982 Google LLC
Network type
cloud
Reverse DNS
33.34.110.136.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country
Singapore SG
Flags
cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact
found in the registry
Checked

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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Every listing carries its evidence on its page, and blocks are lifted only by us; if you were blocked and have fixed the cause, write to abuse-reports@abuse.servbg.com.