136.108.105.162

Blocked Scanner Toolkit

Blocked since UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score
44/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level
Persistent
Attack-shaped requests
195all time
Active days
1UTC days
First seen
Last seen
Servers hit
2
Targets
1site
Times blocked
1by the evidence rules

First seen on UTC, most recently active on UTC.

Recorded 195 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (64 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (37); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (22).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against zmey.eu.

Scored into the "Scanner" level now; the highest it has reached is "Persistent". Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began UTC, with 195 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: , with no end date.

Daily counts
Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)Requests
195
  • At least 115 requests a minute at its peak ( UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
  • Methods: GET 173, POST 15.
  • The servers we watch answered: 404 168, 403 22 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
TimeSiteWhat happenedRequestUser agentSeen by
zmey.eu2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)POST /cgi-bin/php?declared botweb
zmey.eufuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that respondsPOST /index.php?declared botweb
zmey.eu2× tried to abuse a PHP-CGI argument-injection flaw (allow_url_include/auto_prepend_file) to execute code (2 distinct paths)POST /cgi-bin/php?declared botweb
zmey.eutried to abuse a local or remote file inclusion parameter such as allow_url_includePOST /php-cgi/php-cgi.exe?declared botweb
zmey.eufuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that respondsPOST /index.php?declared botweb
zmey.euclaimed to be Googlebot while POSTing, something the real crawler never doesPOST /api/v1/validate/codedeclared botweb
zmey.eu2× swept a generic login/signup/account/dashboard route this site does not expose, consistent with an automated app-framework scanner/apinoneweb
zmey.eufuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that respondsGET /i.phpdeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested phpinfo.php, which dumps the full PHP configuration and environment if left in placeGET /phpinfo.phpdeclared botweb
zmey.eu2× fuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that responds (2 distinct paths)GET /test.phpdeclared botweb
zmey.eu3× probed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left open (3 distinct paths)GET /actuator/mappingsdeclared botweb
zmey.euprobed for an exposed GraphQL endpoint or its config file, often a precursor to an introspection queryGET /graphql/consoledeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticatedGET /v1/onboarding/config?declared botweb
zmey.euprobed for an exposed GraphQL endpoint or its config file, often a precursor to an introspection queryGET /graphqldeclared botweb
zmey.eu3× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated (3 distinct paths)GET /api/configdeclared botweb
zmey.eufuzzed a short, random filename looking for a forgotten script that respondsGET /info.phpdeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /credentials.jsondeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /.env.jsdeclared botweb
zmey.euprobed a Spring Boot actuator endpoint, which can leak environment variables and internal config if left openGET /actuator/loggersdeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /secrets.envdeclared botweb
zmey.eu2× requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable/.gitnoneweb
zmey.euused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /userfiles?declared botweb
zmey.eu2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)GET /config.json.jsdeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /api/system/fileView?declared botweb
zmey.eu2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)GET /credentials.jsdeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection stringsGET /docker-compose.yamldeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webrootGET /.git-credentialsdeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection stringsGET /docker-compose.ymldeclared botweb
zmey.eu2× probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config (2 distinct paths)GET /.git/HEADdeclared botweb
zmey.eu2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)GET /.aws/configdeclared botweb
zmey.eutried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flawGET /api/system/fileView?declared botweb
zmey.eurequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /web/.envdeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistakeGET /.aws/credentialsdeclared botweb
zmey.eurequested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentialsGET /public/.envdeclared botweb
zmey.euused a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web rootGET /cache/original/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.envdeclared botweb
zmey.eu2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)GET /core/.envdeclared botweb

Network

ASN
AS396982 Google LLC
Network type
cloud
Reverse DNS
162.105.108.136.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country
United States US
Flags
cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact
found in the registry
Checked

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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