136.107.32.213

Blocked Persistent Toolkit

Blocked since 15 Oct 2026 15:37 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 46/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 256all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 15 Oct 2026
Last seen: 15 Oct 2026 15:34
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 15 Oct 2026 15:34 UTC, most recently active on 15 Oct 2026 15:34 UTC.

Recorded 256 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (130 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (39); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (19).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against zmey.eu.

Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 15 Oct 2026 15:00 UTC, with 256 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: honeypot, web-app. Attack types: known exploits, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 15 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
15 Oct 2026	256

At least 256 requests a minute at its peak (15 Oct 2026 15:34 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 254, POST 12.
The servers we watch answered: 404 243, 200 6, 403 6 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
15 Oct 2026
15:34	zmey.eu	2× sent a request whose combined suspicious-pattern score crossed the web firewall's alert threshold; the request was observed and not blocked (2 distinct paths)	`/icecoder/lib/file-control.php`	none	web
15:34	zmey.eu	2× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (2 distinct paths)	`POST /settings`	declared bot	edge
15:34	zmey.eu	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /_nuxt/../.env`	declared bot	edge
15:34	zmey.eu	2× triggered Cloudflare's managed rule for a Next.js server-action request-smuggling/RCE attempt (2 distinct paths)	`POST /admin`	declared bot	edge
15:34	zmey.eu	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /firebaseConfig.js`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	6× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (6 distinct paths)	`GET /lib/.env`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /samconfig.toml`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)	`GET /ai/.env`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /terraform.tfstate.backup`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /api/orders/..%2f..%2f.env`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.local?`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	tried to read /proc/self/environ to dump process environment variables, usually via a traversal or inclusion flaw	`GET /@fs/proc/self/environ?`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /agent/.env`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env`	declared bot	edge
15:34	zmey.eu	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.production.yml`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /infra/.env`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.staging.yml`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /deploy/.env`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.dev.yml`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /workspace/.env`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.prod.yml`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /api/v1/.env`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings	`GET /docker-compose.override.yml`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /project/.env`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_dsa`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.docker/secrets.json`	declared bot	web
15:34	zmey.eu	4× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (4 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.production?`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 213.32.107.136.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: United States US
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 15 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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