104.199.218.8

Blocked Persistent Toolkit

Blocked since 15 Oct 2026 17:52 UTC, no end date. Our servers refuse it, web requests included, and it is in feed.txt.

Record

Score: 46/100each request counts half as much after 30 days
Worst level: Persistent
Attack-shaped requests: 266all time
Active days: 1UTC days
First seen: 15 Oct 2026
Last seen: 15 Oct 2026 17:47
Servers hit: 2
Targets: 1site
Times blocked: 0by the evidence rules

First seen on 15 Oct 2026 17:47 UTC, most recently active on 15 Oct 2026 17:47 UTC.

Recorded 266 attack-shaped requests across 1 separate day.

Its traffic requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (139 requests); it also used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root (39); it also requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (19).

Seen by our edge and web sensors, against servbg.com.

Scored into the "Persistent" level, its highest so far. Badge: Toolkit.

Its busiest hour on record began 15 Oct 2026 17:00 UTC, with 266 requests.

Routed via AS396982 (Google LLC), a cloud network.

Surfaces: honeypot, web-app. Attack types: fake crawlers, injection, scanning, hunting for secrets. Seen by: edge, web.

Activity, last 90 days

Active on 1 of the last 90 UTC days. Current block: 15 Oct 2026, with no end date.

Daily counts

Attack requests per UTC day, days with activity only
Day (UTC)	Requests
15 Oct 2026	266

At least 266 requests a minute at its peak (15 Oct 2026 17:47 UTC; identical requests in the same second are stored once).
Methods: GET 257, POST 1.
The servers we watch answered: 403 188, 404 82, 200 5 (totals only, from our web servers).

Evidence

Newest first, the latest 50 stored requests grouped into runs. Times are UTC. The user agent is shown as its family only.

Evidence, newest first, grouped by UTC day
Time	Site	What happened	Request	User agent	Seen by
15 Oct 2026
17:47	servbg.com	requested the .git directory itself, hoping it is exposed and browsable	`/.git`	none	web
17:47	servbg.com	probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/config`	declared bot	edge
17:47	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /secrets.env`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /credentials.json`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.config`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /secrets.json`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.git-credentials`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /.config/gcloud/credentials.db`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	2× requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot (2 distinct paths)	`GET /.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /.cargo/credentials.toml`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_ed25519`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /.dbeaver/credentials-config.json`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	probed for an exposed .git directory to download the site's source history and config	`GET /.git/HEAD`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested a private SSH key file by its conventional name	`GET /.ssh/id_rsa`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.preprod`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	claimed to be Bingbot while requesting an admin or credentials path the real crawler never touches	`GET /.env.dev.local`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.keys`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	made a request that matched no known pattern	`GET /supabase/config.toml`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	3× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (3 distinct paths)	`GET /.env.credentials`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	3× requested a generic /config or /api/config endpoint, hoping the app exposes its runtime configuration unauthenticated	`/config`	none	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env`	declared bot	edge
17:47	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /.aws/config`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.production`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested .htaccess or .htpasswd, which can leak access rules or password hashes	`GET /.htpasswd`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /.env.example`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested an AWS credentials file left in a web-accessible path by mistake	`GET /.aws/credentials`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials	`GET /core/.env`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	2× requested docker-compose.yml, which often contains embedded passwords and connection strings (2 distinct paths)	`GET /docker-compose.yml`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	5× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (5 distinct paths)	`GET /build/.env`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /push_config.json`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles/x?`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /server/.env`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles?`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	requested a common cloud/app secrets or credentials filename (AWS, GCP, Firebase, Kubernetes service-account token, SSH, master key) from a wordlist, hoping one was left in the webroot	`GET /config/firebase-admin.json`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	2× requested a .env file, hoping to find API keys or database credentials (2 distinct paths)	`GET /src/.env`	declared bot	web
17:47	servbg.com	used a directory-traversal segment (literal or percent-encoded ../) in the request path to try to escape the web root	`GET /userfiles/x?`	declared bot	web

Network

ASN: AS396982 Google LLC
Network type: cloud
Reverse DNS: 8.218.199.104.bc.googleusercontent.com
Country: Taiwan TW
Flags: cloud range (GCP)
Abuse contact: found in the registry
Checked: 15 Oct 2026

Elsewhere: GreyNoise, Shodan, AbuseIPDB.

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